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I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous scholars have offered justifications for bankruptcy's dis-
charge, or "fresh start." 1 Their theories may explain why society would of-
fer debt relief to the insolvent, but they do not explain why this relief should 
be offered in the form of a bankruptcy discharge. While many think of 
bankruptcy and insolvency as the same,2 they are not. Insolvency means the 
"inability to pay debts,"3 and the available evidence suggests that most in-
solvent consumers default without filing for bankruptcy.4 Non-bankruptcy 
law simply does not provide creditors with sufficient remedies to force these 
consumers to repay in full. Creditors are not merely faced with the difficulty 
of squeezing blood from a turnip; both federal and state laws consciously 
limit the ability of creditors to enforce their claims. Any normative theory of 
consumer bankruptcy must explain how bankruptcy interacts with non-
bankruptcy law within a larger system of debt relief. 
Generations of scholars have argued over bankruptcy's role within a 
larger system of debtor-creditor law,5 but this literature focuses almost ex-
I. See, e.g .. Charles G. Hallinan. The "Fresh Start"' Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49 (1986) (reviewing the literature); Marga-
ret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987); Thomas H. 
Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law. 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393. 1402 (1985); Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Discharge-
ability Debate, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 56, 89-103 (1990) (reviewing the literature). The phrase "fresh 
start"' derives from an early twentieth century Supreme Court decision. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234,244 (1934). Bankruptcy gives "the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the 
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear tleld for future 
effort. unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." ld. (emphasis added). 
2. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 172 (3d ed. 1961) (defining a 
bankrupt as "a person who becomes insolvent"). 
3. ld. at 1170. 
4. See. e.g., AM. BANKER's Ass'N, 1997 INSTALLMENT CREDIT SURVEY REPORT 109 (9th ed. 
1997) (reporting that approximately seventy percent of all bank consumer credit losses occur outside of 
bankruptcy); VISA U.S.A., INC., 1999 ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY SURVEY (2000) (reporting that two-thirds 
of credit card loans charged off as uncollectible are not attributable to bankruptcy). Note, however, that 
some of these loans may be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding after they are charged off as uncol-
lectible. Also note that these percentages are based on outstanding loans and not individuals. However, it 
is likely that the percentage of debtors who use bankruptcy is even lower because those who are most 
likely to be judgment proof outside of bankruptcy-those with low incomes-are less likely to have 
large loans. 
5. See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, BANKRUPTCY ANTHOLOGY 51-133 (2002) (providing ex-
cerpts of articles on the role of bankruptcy); Garrand Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of 
Fraud. and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373 (1937); James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy a 
Commercial Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1902); Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 (1940). 
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elusively on bankrupt businesses rather than bankrupt consumers.6 Unfortu-
nately, the purposes assigned to bankruptcy in the debate over business 
bankruptcy do not readily apply to our current system of consumer bank-
ruptcy. These theories of business bankruptcy focus on bankruptcy's ability 
to better distribute scarce assets among creditors who will not be paid in 
fult1 However, Chapter 7, the most common form of consumer bank-
ruptcy,8 generally does not distribute any assets to general creditors. Over 
ninety-five percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcies yield no repayment for gen-
eral creditors,9 and many of the Chapter 7 filings that do result in distribu-
. b' bkru' 10 twos are usmess an ptc1es. 
Bankruptcy may offer important procedural advantages for insolvent 
consumers and their creditors, but this does not justify our current structure 
of debtor-creditor law. Society could adopt a largely procedural bankruptcy 
system that provides the posited advantages of an organized distribution of 
proceeds to creditors and still offers consumers the same debt relief that 
they would receive under non-bankruptcy law. 11 However, our current sys-
tem of consumer bankruptcy departs sharply from this procedural model. 
Although the existing Bankruptcy Code largely looks to non-bankruptcy 
law to determine how much (if any) of a consumer's assets creditors can 
seize,12 it ignores non-bankruptcy law when determining how much income 
6. For example, in a famous debate over the role of bankruptcy within a larger system of debtor-
creditor law, Professors Douglas Baird and Elizabeth Warren explicitly limit their debate to business 
bankruptcy. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to 
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815 (1987); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 
776-77 (1987) ("In order to join issue more clearly and to narrow the focus of the debate somewhat, 
Professor Baird and I have agreed to debate the basis of bankruptcy policy in the context of business 
bankruptcies."). 
7. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 ( 1982) (arguing that bankruptcy can help solve a race to the assets by provid-
ing for pro rata distributions to general creditors and thus maximizing collections for creditors); Warren, 
supra note 6, at 785 ("Bankruptcy law aims first to conserve and divide an estate that cannot meet all its 
obligations .... "). 
8. In the second quarter of 2004, approximately seventy-three percent of all non-business bankrupt 
debtors chose Chapter 7. ABI World, Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1990-2004, per 
Quarter, available at http://www.abiworld.org!femplate.cfm?Section=Non_business_Bankruptcy_Filin 
gs&CONTENTID= I 0996&TEMPLA TE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Sept. 
26, 2004). 
9. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM: 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000, 7 (2001) (explaining that 
"[h]istorically, the vast majority (about 95 to 97 percent) of Chapter 7 cases yield no assets."), available 
at http :1/www. usdoj. gov /ustlli brary/chapter07/assetcases/Pub licat. pdf. 
10. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO 
CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS, GAO/GGD-94-173 (July 28, 1994) (noting that business cases repre-
sented about a third of all asset Chapter 7 cases and generated about eighty percent of all revenue), 
available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152238.pdf. 
II. See infra Part II.C.3. 
12. The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the choice of the exemptions available under non-
bankruptcy law or cenain bankruptcy-only exemptions. II U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000). However, the Code 
also gives each state the right to "opt-out" of these bankruptcy-only exemptions and force their residents 
to choose the non-bankruptcy exemptions, and about two-thirds of the states have done so. See Richard 
M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of State Property Exemptions, 47 J.L. & EcoN. 19,26-27 (2004) 
[hereinafter Political Economy]. 
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the consumer must repay and for how long the consumer must keep repay-
ing.t3 
Other scholars have recognized that our system of consumer bankruptcy 
could take a very different form. For example, Professor Jackson notes that 
the discharge could be granted in a proceeding that lacks a mechanism for 
collecting assets from the debtor or distributing proceeds to creditors. 14 Yet 
the system of public notice that he suggests as an alternative for providing a 
discharge could still be described as a form of bankruptcy because it would 
serve as a proceeding that compels all creditors of a single debtor to accept 
"some arrangement or some disposition of their claims against the bank-
rupt's property, whether they all agreed to it or not."15 
This Article makes a stronger claim: by amending non-bankruptcy col-
lections laws, society could largely replicate the fresh start offered by the 
bankruptcy discharge without any formal proceeding at all. 16 Non-
bankruptcy exemptions can protect a consumer's wages from garnishment 
and her assets from attachment, and other laws can protect the consumer 
from harassment. Of course, the consumer's debts will remain outstanding, 
and she must labor under the threat that her creditors will one day be able to 
enforce their claims or judgments. However, society can adopt short statutes 
of limitations so that the consumer need not fear these claims and judgments 
after a reasonable amount of time has passed. 17 
The central question addressed by this Article is why we offer substan-
tially more, or at least different, debt relief in our bankruptcy system than 
we offer under non-bankruptcy law. 18 This Article argues that the most 
plausible explanation is that bankruptcy facilitates means-testing, broadly 
defined as a determination that the consumer lacks the means to repay her 
debts. Therefore, there should be no debate over whether consumer bank-
ruptcy should be means-tested; 19 the raison d 'etre of consumer bankruptcy 
is means-testing. 
One may argue, however, over the form that this means-test should 
take. A formal proceeding (binding on all creditors) may facilitate an 
13. See infra Part II. C. 
14. See Jackson, supra note I, at 1396 n.8 ("For example, the law might grant discharge through a 
system of public notice whereby certain assets (such as future wages) would be freed from the claims of 
existing creditors. The mechanism of public notice would inform creditors of the debtor's election."). 
15. See Radin, supra note 5, at 4. 
16. See i'lfra Part II. 
17. See infra Part II.B.3. 
18. The previous literature does offer three possible explanations for the puzzle, but none of these 
explanations withstand scrutiny. See infra Part III. A. The relationship between the bankruptcy discharge 
and the statute of limitations is largely unexplored in the literature. But see, e.g, Discussion, 41 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PRoss. 123, 125 (1977) (noting that a discharge and a statute of limitations raise similar 
issues and calling for further study). 
19. See, e.g., Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 177 (1999); Gary Klein, Means-Tested Bankruptcy: What Would it Mean?, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 
711 (1998); Resolved: The Time has Come for Means- Tested Consumer Bankruptcy, 17 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 6 (1998) (excerpting a debate); Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means· 
Testing, 7 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REV. 105 (1999). 
2004] Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy? 125 
evaluation of the consumer's financial condition because it would be too 
expensive to relitigate this issue with each creditor. However, American 
bankruptcy law has never contained an explicit requirement that consumers 
repay their debts if they have sufficient income,20 and bankruptcy law pro-
fessors have traditionally opposed costly investigations of consumers' abil-
ity to repay.21 The law need not conduct any investigation to "means-test" 
bankruptcy; the law could rely on punishment to verify that consumers need 
relief.22 Perhaps bankruptcy facilitates this punishment. 
If one does conclude that the bankruptcy proceeding helps verify that a 
consumer needs debt relief, one must explain why society offers any debt 
relief to debtors who do not file for bankruptcy. That is, society could adopt 
draconian non-bankruptcy collections measures on the theory that if the 
consumer were truly unable to pay her debts she would prove this fact in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Yet the law does not do this. Instead, it creates par-
tially overlapping systems of debt relief and allows the consumer to choose 
between them. 
Perhaps this overlapping system is designed to accommodate the di-
verse group of debtors who become insolvent. If society requires a more 
complicated system to determine when wealthier, or higher income, con-
sumers should repay some of their debts, it may adopt this complicated sys-
tem along with a parallel system designed for consumers with fewer assets 
or lower income. Society must structure these systems so that each con-
sumer selects the system appropriate for her circumstances. 
The proper role of bankruptcy in the larger system of debt relief has im-
portant implications for the current debate over bankruptcy reform. For ex-
ample, the consumer credit industry is currently pushing for an explicit 
means-test in bankruptcy against near-uniform opposition from bankruptcy 
law professors.23 One of the primary arguments scholars make against the 
proposed reforms is that they will raise the cost of filing for bankruptcy to a 
price beyond the reach of consumers who truly need bankruptcy relief?4 
20. Today a debtor may be denied access to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code if the court deems 
her filing to be a "substantial abuse" of the Code. II U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). While most, if not all, 
courts would consider the debtor's "ability to pay" in the substantial abuse analysis, there is broad dis-
agreement as to the meaning of the phrase "substantial abuse" and how vigorously courts should enforce 
this provision: See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
21. For example, more than eighty bankruptcy law professors have written an open letter to Con-
gress claiming that the means-testing provisions of the pending bankruptcy legislation would impose 
unacceptably high costs on the bankruptcy system. See Letter from various law professors to Congress 
(Sept. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Letter of Sept. 7, 1999] (on file with author) ("Dozens of provisions in S. 
625 ... increase the cost and complexity of the system."). 
22. See infra Part III.B.2. For an interesting theoretical inquiry into the use of punishment and 
information to verify a debtor's inability to repay, see Kelly Welch, From Debtor's Prison to Bank-
ruptcy: The Enforcement of Optimal Debt Contracts (Working Paper 200 I) (on file with author). 
23. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 
BANKR. DEV. J. I, 48 (2001) (emphasizing that "[t]he vast majority of America's bankruptcy law profes-
sors have repeatedly expressed their vehement opposition to the bankruptcy reform bills. About 100 
professors have written Congress on four separate occasions imploring Congress not to pass such a bill. 
Exactly two law professors have urged passage."). 
24. See, e.g., Letter of Sept. 7, 1999, supra note 21 ("The trick is identifying the real abusers at an 
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This last criticism loses much of its sting if consumers who cannot af-
ford to file for bankruptcy receive adequate debt relief from non-bankruptcy 
laws that limit collection. While the literature recognizes the existence of 
these non-bankruptcy laws,25 it largely treats such limitations as exogenous 
to the normative discussion of bankruptcy law?6 In fact, the literature seems 
more willing to discuss potential reforms to our nation's social insurance27 
or even public education28 systems than changes in non-bankruptcy collec-
tions.29 This Article argues that the distinction between bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy law is largely artificial. Since both are part of a larger system of 
debt relief, they must be considered together. 
Part II argues that the law can roughly duplicate the relief offered by 
consumer bankruptcy without the need of a formal proceeding that we 
would call bankruptcy. Society may find that a bankruptcy proceeding of-
fers some advantages unavailable under non-bankruptcy law. However, 
these advantages may be achieved in a procedural bankruptcy system that 
looks to non-bankruptcy law to determine the total amount that a consumer 
must pay. 
Part ill suggests that society may wish to depart from a purely proce-
dural model of bankruptcy if the bankruptcy process helps determine a con-
sumer's need for relief. Part IV explores the justification for non-bankruptcy 
acceptable cost, without unfairly burdening those 'honest but unfortunate' debtors who legitimately need 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief."); Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather 
Than Means-Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect from Can Pay Consumer Debtors After Bank-
ruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. lNST. J. 6 (Feb. 2003) ("Because preparing a means-testing calculation would 
make filing in bankruptcy more complex and thus time-consuming, the predictable effect would be to 
drive up fees of lawyers and document-preparers. Some of the worst-off debtors would be unable to 
afford a bankruptcy discharge."). 
25. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN &AMEUA WARRENTYAGI, THE TwO INCOME TRAP !54 (2003) 
("Although one wouldn't guess it from all the fiery rhetoric, bankruptcy filings account for just a frac-
tion of lending industry losses; in the large majority of cases, the bank simply gets tired of trying to 
collect."); Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means-Testing as a Distrac-
tion and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. 
lNST. L. REv. I, 9 (1998) ("Of course, debtors excluded from bankruptcy do not necessarily repay their 
debts, so reductions in bankruptcy losses are not equivalent to reductions in default losses."). 
26. These scholars sometimes criticize the consumer credit industry for exaggerating the cost of 
bankruptcy, noting that much of the debt discharged in bankruptcy would not have been collected even if 
the debtor did not file. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 82 
(2004). Similarly, we should not overestimate the benefit of bankruptcy; many consumers in financial 
distress would be able to avoid repaying their debts even if they had no access to bankruptcy. 
27. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 257-61 (2000) (discussing bankruptcy's role within a 
larger social safety net). 
28. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 25, at 32-46. 
29. In fact, these scholars sometimes ignore the existence of these laws entirely when discussing the 
adverse effects of depriving consumers of access to the bankruptcy discharge. See, e.g., WARREN & 
TYAGI, supra note 25, at 154-55 ("Families [barred from receiving a bankruptcy discharge] would no 
longer be able to free themselves from certain unsecured debts, so they would be required to make pay-
ments (plus penalties, late fees, and interest) on some of those bills for the rest of their natural lives-
even if those payments took up 100 percent of their paychecks."). This quotation ignores federal law that 
prohibits general creditors from seizing more than twenty-five percent of a debtor's take-home pay. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2002). Of course, tax and certain family Jaw creditors can seize up to sixty percent of 
some consumers' paychecks, id., but these claims would not be discharged in bankruptcy anyway. II 
U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(l), (5) (2000). 
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relief assuming that bankruptcy provides a superior means of verifying a 
consumer's need for relief. Part IV suggests that a primary justification for 
this non-bankruptcy relief is that it provides a more cost-effective method 
for determining that lower-income debtors are unable to repay their debts. 
This conclusion has important implications for the debate over bankruptcy 
reform as it suggests that a great many bankrupt consumers do not belong in 
bankruptcy. 
II. PROVIDING BANKRUPTCY'S "FRESH START" 
WITH NON-BANKRUPTCY LAW 
The best evidence that the law may provide effective debt relief without 
a bankruptcy discharge is that most insolvent consumers do not file for 
bankruptcy?0 Of course, in some cases the creditor may abandon collection 
efforts because he believes that the consumer will file for bankruptcy if 
pressed,31 and many insolvent consumers actually do choose bankruptcy. 
Therefore, it is useful to describe the debt relief that bankruptcy offers and 
demonstrate how non-bankruptcy law could (and to some extent does) pro-
vide similar relief. 
A. The Protections Afforded by Bankruptcy 
The overwhelming majority of American consumers who receive a 
bankruptcy discharge do so in Chapter 7.32 Society could adopt a very dif-
ferent system of consumer bankruptcy. Generations of scholars have argued 
that a system of debt adjustment such as that used in our current Chapter 13 
should be much more common, 33 and scholars periodically advocate a sys-
tem that, like the bankruptcy system used in some other common-law coun-
30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., Michele White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L EcoN. & 
ORG. 205 (1998) (arguing that many consumers do not file for bankruptcy because they can avoid re-
payment by credibly threatening to do so). 
32. Chapter 7 accounts for approximately seventy percent of all non-business bankruptcy filings 
with almost aJI of the remaining non-business bankruptcies filed in Chapter 13. See ABI World, supra 
note 8. This statistic understates the role of Chapter 7 because only about one-third of Chapter 13 filings 
result in a discharge. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 215-17 (1989) (finding a two-thirds failure rate for Chap-
ter 13 cases); Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 
13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 557, 557 (2001) (finding that a majority of 
plans were not completed); Maijorie L. Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy 
Legislation for Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 40-42 (1989) (finding a sixty-three percent completion rate 
in Buffalo, N.Y.); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Dis-
charge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13,7 AM. BANKR.INST. L REV. 415,440 (1999) (finding a one-
third completion rate in one district in Mississippi); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized 
Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bank-
ruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 tbl.2 (1994) (finding that only thirty-one percent of Chapter 13 
cases closed as completed). 
33. In fact, the desire to increase the use of these individual repayment plans was an important 
argument supporting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, ch. 3, at 122 (1977). 
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tries,34 effectively taxes the consumer's post-bankruptcy income for the 
benefit of her creditors. 35 
Though consumer bankruptcy can take many forms, it commonly offers 
four types of protection. First, bankruptcy provides consumers with tempo-
rary protection against creditor harassment and continued calls for repay-
ment. Second, bankruptcy provides consumers with at least some protection 
of their assets and income while they are in bankruptcy. Third, the bank-
ruptcy discharge effectively frees all of the consumer's future income and 
assets from the claims of pre-petition creditors and makes the protection 
from harassment by these pre-petition creditors permanent. Fourth, bank-
ruptcy sometimes, but not always, provides the consumer with relief from 
the threat of foreclosure by secured creditors. 
1. Chapter 7 
When a consumer files for bankruptcy the court imposes an automatic 
stal6 that immediately, though perhaps temporarily, stops collections ef-
forts such as telephone calls and letters demanding repayment. Consumers 
who file under Chapter 7 and meet certain requirements receive an immedi-
ate discharge of their debts37 which enjoins future collections efforts and 
makes protection from harassment permanent.38 This discharge effectively 
shields any post-petition income that the consumer earns and any new assets 
that the consumer acquires from attachment by the consumer's pre-petition 
creditors. Thus, Chapter 7 protects the consumer' income earned during the 
bankruptcy process or thereafter. 
Chapter 7 also provides consumers with substantial protection of their 
assets while in bankruptcy. In exchange for the discharge, the consumer 
must forfeit any assets that she has at the time of her petition if these assets 
are not protected by a bankruptcy exemption?9 These assets are then liqui-
dated with the proceeds distributed to certain priority creditors40 and then to 
general creditors on a pro rata basis.41 However, the bankruptcy exemptions 
are typically generous relative to the actual assets of most Americans,42 to 
34. See. e.g., Rafael Erfat, The Fresh Start Policy in Israel, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L REv. 555 (1999) 
(providing a brief description of the bankruptcy systems in various common-law countries); Paul B. 
Lewis, Can't Pay Your Debts, Mate? A Comparison of the Australian and American Personal Bank-
ruptcy Systems, 18 BANKR. DEY. J. 297 (2002) (describing the Australian bankruptcy system). 
35. See Braucher & Mooney, supra note 24 (proposing a system that assesses an effective tax on the 
consumer's income in bankruptcy); Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bank-
ruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (2000) (proposing a system that as-
sesses an effective tax on the consumer's income in bankruptcy). 
36. ll U.S.C. § 362 (2000). 
37. Chapter 7 will not discharge some debts, such as child support, taxes, or fraudulently obtained 
debts. /d. § 727. 
38. /d. § 524. 
39. /d. § 522. 
40. /d. § 507. 
41. /d.§ 726. 
42. For example, in 1995 the median homeowner had roughly fifty thousand dollars of home equity. 
See, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND 
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say nothing of most Americans in financial distress.43 Moreover, bankruptcy 
courts allow consumers to sell many of their non-exempt assets and pur-
chase exempt assets prior to filing.44 As a result, only a very small minority 
of consumers in Chapter 7 have non-exempt assets when they file. Distribu-
tions to general creditors are largely a matter of theory in non-business 
Chapter 7 cases. 45 
As mentioned above, bankrupt consumers must meet specific require-
ments to obtain a discharge in Chapter 7. For example, the consumer cannot 
hide assets from creditors or lie to the court,46 and the consumer cannot have 
obtained another bankruptcy discharge within the last six years.47 Moreover, 
since 1984, either the bankruptcy judge or the U.S. Trustee (but not the con-
sumer's creditors or the bankruptcy trustee) can move to dismiss the con-
sumer's bankruptcy petition if he believes the petition to be a "substantial 
abuse" of the Code.4 The meaning of this term is unclear, but many courts 
assume that it has something to do with the debtor's ability to pay debts as 
they come due.49 The pending bankruptcy reforms would appllc a more ex-
plicit test of a consumer's ability to repay out of future income. 0 
Chapter 7 offers the consumer only limited protection of assets that the 
consumer has pledged as collateral. In theory, the consumer can redeem 
collateral by paying the secured creditor the lesser of the total amount owed 
or the market value of the collateral.51 In practice, however, this right is 
rather limited because redemption requires cash, and few bankrupt consum-
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION v-vii (Michael E. Davern & Patricia J. Fisher) (2001 ). Twenty-two states have 
exemptions that would allow them to exempt at least this amount. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Non-
Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. lll. L. Rev. 301, 309-12 [hereinafter Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy]. 
43. One study of bankrupt debtors in 1991 revealed that the median homeowner in bankruptcy had 
just $5,500 in home equity. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 221. 
44. For a discussion of the limits of pre-bankruptcy planning, see Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen 
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets 011 the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the 
Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995). 
45. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
46. II U.S.C. § 727 (2000). 
47. Id. The debtor may be able to receive a Chapter 7 discharge if her prior discharge was given in 
Chapter 12 or 13, she paid at least seventy percent of her unsecured creditors' claims, and she made her 
"best effort." See id. The pending bankruptcy reform legislation would make the consumer wait eight 
years. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-975, § 
312 (2003). 
48. II U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). 
49. Some courts hold that an ability to pay one's debts alone supports a finding of substantial abuse. 
E.g., In re Kelly. 841 F.2d. 908. 914-15 (9th Cir. 1988); accord United States v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74,76 
(8th Cir. 1992). However, other courts find that an ability to pay one's debts is not sufficient by itself to 
find substantial abuse. See, e.g., In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). Still, most courts seem 
to regard the ability to pay as the primary consideration in the substantial abuse analysis. See, e.g., In re 
Lamanna, 153 F.3d l, 5 (1st Cir. 1998); /11 re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 808-09 (lOth Cir. 1999). As dis-
cussed below, some academics claim that these standards are not vigorously enforced. See infra note 350 
and accompanying text. 
50. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, supra note 47, § 102. 
51. Section 506 divides the secured creditor's claim into a secured claim equal to the market value 
of the collateral and an unsecured claim equal to the remaining balance of the loan. The debtor is able to 
redeem the collateral in bankruptcy by repaying the secured claim. II U.S.C. § 722 (2000). However, if 
the debtor does not redeem the collateral in bankruptcy, the creditor will retain a lien with a value equal 
to the entire face value of her original claim. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1992). 
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ers have this in an abundant supply.52 As a result, the secured creditor can 
credibly threaten to repossess collateral at the conclusion of the bankruptcy 
proceeding53 if it is not paid in full. 54 Because of this threat, consumers will 
often reaffirm debts secured by collateral that they wish to retain. 55 
In short, consumers who choose Chapter 7 emerge free from debt ex-
cept for those obligations they reaffirm and those obligations that are ex-
empted from the discharge. Their discharge puts an end to the calls seeking 
repayment and frees their future income from attachment. While in theory 
consumers must sacrifice their non-exempt assets to gain this discharge, in 
practice the number of bankrupt consumers who have any non-exempt as-
sets is negligible. Still, Chapter 7 provides at most temporary relief from 
secured debts, and consumers are likely to reaffirm these debts if they wish 
to keep the assets that they have pledged as collateral. 
2. Chapter 13 and Other Systems of Debt Adjustment 
In contrast to the relatively expeditious Chapter 7, Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cies can last up to five years, as consumers must propose and complete a 
repayment plan if they are to receive a discharge. 56 During this time the 
automatic stay will protect consumers from harassment in much the same 
way that it protects the consumer in Chapter 7.57 If a consumer successfully 
completes a repayment plan, the court will grant a discharge that, like the 
discharge of Chapter 7, will make the protection from harassment perma-
nent and shield the consumer's post-bankruptcy income and assets from 
most pre-petition creditors. 58 
One of the major differences between Chapters 7 and 13 is the treatment 
of the consumer's income and assets in bankruptcy. A commonly cited 
benefit of Chapter 13 is its ability to help the consumer retain assets that are 
52. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 293 (2001) ("For most debtors, section 722 might as well base redemption on the debtor 
running a three minute mile."). 
53. A secured creditor could foreclose sooner if given relief from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 
362 (2000). 
54. A few courts allow debtors to simply retain their collateral by continuing to make their pre-
bankruptcy payments, but this reasoning has little support in the Code. See, e.g., WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 293-94 (describing the courts' discovery of an "unstated alternative" in 
the Code). 
55. For a discussion of the role of reaffirmations in bankruptcy, see Marianne B. Culhane & 
Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
709, 713 (1999) (finding that twenty-five percent of cases sampled had a reaffirmation agreement in the 
file). Some of the debts that consumers reaffirm are unsecured. The consumer may wish to retain good 
relations with a creditor so that he can obtain credit after bankruptcy. The consumer may also fear that a 
creditor will claim that the debt was obtained by fraud or is otherwise not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000). 
56. II U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000) (providing a default rule of three-year repayment plans but allowing 
a court to order a five-year plan for cause). 
57. Jd. § 362. 
58. The discharge offered in Chapter 13 is substantially broader than the discharge offered in Chap-
ter 7. For example, the consumer in Chapter 13 may obtain a discharge of debts for willful and malicious 
injuries-intentional torts--by the consumer. /d. § 1328. 
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either unprotected by exemptions or pledged as collateral.59 Instead of liqui-
dating the consumer's non-exempt assets, Chapter 13 requires that the con-
sumer propose to pay an amount equal to the value of the assets over the 
course of the plan.60 Perhaps more importantly, Chapter 13 may allow con-
sumers to retain assets pledged as collateral without reaffirming their loans 
because they need not produce enough cash to redeem the collateral imme-
diately. That is, Chapter 13 allows consumers to retain assets pledged as 
collateral as long as they propose to repay an amount equal to the claims 
secured by the collateral.61 Significantly, bankruptcy will generally reduce 
this secured claim, thus reducing the amount that the consumer must pro-
pose to repay to the value of the collateral, but only if this is less than the 
total amount that the consumer owes to the secured creditor.62 
In exchange for this asset protection, Chapter 13 claims some of the in-
come that the consumer earns while in bankruptcy.63 Specifically, if a credi-
tor objects to the consumer's repayment plan, the consumer must promise to 
repay an amount equal to the excess of her projected income over her rea-
sonably necessary expenses during a three-year period.64 If Chapter 13 op-
erated in accordance with its plain meaning, it would simply replace the 
consumer's pre-petition obligations with a new set of obligations deter-
mined in accordance with her ability to pay. Chapter 13 would operate as an 
"Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income."65 
59. See, e.g., Barry Adler et a!., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 585, 587-88 (2000) ("As this sketch suggests, a debtor will file under Chapter 13 when he 
values his nonexempt assets more than the fraction of his future earnings that the court-approved plan 
will require him to give up."). 
60. The plan must pay unsecured creditors an amount equal to what they would have received in a 
Chapter 7 filing, or an amount equal to the debtor's non-exempt assets. II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000). 
61. /d. § 1325(a)(5). 
62. !d. § 506. The remainder of the loan becomes an unsecured obligation. Note, however, that 
bankruptcy courts will not reduce the value of the home mortgage in this manner, id. § l322(b)(2), and 
the pending baokruptcy legislation would exempt other secured loans if the loans were recently used to 
purchase the collateral in question. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 
supra note 47, §§ 306(b), 309(a)(l)(c). 
63. From its inception in 1978 until 1984, Chapter l3's only explicit repayment requirement obli-
gated the consumer to repay as much as she would in Chapter 7. Robert B. Chapman, The Bankruptcy of 
Haig-Simons? The Inequity of Equity and the Definition of Income in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, 10 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 765, 783 (2002). Consumers without non-exempt assets began proposing 
plans that promised little or no repayment for unsecured creditors. Chapter 13's predecessor, Chapter 
XIII, required creditor consent to confirm a plan, II U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (repealed 1978), and as a 
result, almost all plans promised full repayment for all creditors. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE 
GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS REFORM 94 (1971) (finding that approximately ninety-nine 
percent of Chapter XIII plans proposed to pay all debts in full); accord BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN 
N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 'II 9.01, at 9-3 (2d ed. 1986). Some judges reacted to the 
appearance of low or no repayment plans by ruling that the plans violated the good faith requirements of 
Chapter 13. See, e.g., In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650, 653 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) ("Although debtor's plan 
meets the best effort test, it falls considerably shon of meeting the substantial payment requirement."); 
In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624, 625 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to confirm a plan unless it paid seventy 
percent of allowed unsecured claims). For a general review of these cases, see Brandon L. Johnson, 
Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should rhe Good Faith Inquiry Evaluate the Proposed Amount of 
Repayment?, 36GoNZ. L. REV. 375 (2000-01). 
64. 11 U.S.C. § l325(b) (2000). 
65. This is in fact the title of Chapter 13./d. §§ 1301-1330. 
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Note that this system of debt adjustment is not unique to Chapter 13. 
For example, the bankruptcy chapter for family farmers, Chapter 12, con-
tains a provision almost identical to that of Chapter 13.66 Bankruptcy courts 
in England have long conditioned discharge on the future payment of an 
amount fixed by the court with reference to the consumer's ability to pay.67 
Of course this adjustment of debts is not absolute. Chapter 12,68 Chapter 
13,69 and the English system70 would allow for an additional adjustment of 
these obligations if the consumer's financial condition materially changed. 
In practice, Chapter 13 may not operate as its language would suggest. 
Some scholars argue that in many jurisdictions the consumer must propose a 
minimum percentage repayment for unsecured creditors or else face costly 
litigation that she simply cannot afford.71 Others argue that this projected 
disposable income clause provides little leverage for creditors because most 
consumers remain free to file under Chapter 7 and thus are able to propose 
plans with very little repayment.72 Finally, some courts order the consumer 
to include in her plan a promise to increase her payments if her actual in-
come exceeds her projected income. 73 Such a clause effectively imposes an 
income tax on the consumer. 
In short, like Chapter 7, Chapter 13 protects consumers from harass-
ment. Chapter 13 does not offer consumers an immediate discharge; they 
are asked to make payments from their income over a period of three to five 
years. In exchange the consumers are given a greater ability to retain assets. 
66. /d.§ 1225(b). 
67. See, e.g., JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES: A CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 115-19 (2003) (discussing "income payment orders" that are determined by a court's 
evaluation of the debtor's ability to pay); Douglass G. Boshkoff, Umited, Conditional, and Suspended 
Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 81-82 (1982) (describ-
ing a system in which debtors make "voluntary" pledges of repayment out of their future income in 
exchange for a discharge). 
68. II U.S.C § 1229 (2000). 
69. /d. § 1329. 
70. See, e.g., Boshkoff, supra note 67, at 75-103 (describing the English system); The Insolvency 
Service, Dep't of Trade & Industry of England and Wales, Guide to Bankruptcy (2004 ), available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/gtbweb.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). 
71. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 532 (1993) ("The reality is that Chapter 13 trustees and judges in the four cities 
[studied] effectively deter 0% plans and keep most plans above a floor percent that is known to local 
practitioners."). This impression is shared by those who advise consumers on how to file for bankruptcy. 
See, e.g., ROBIN LEONARD, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY: REPAY YOUR DEBTS 7/1 (5th ed. 2001) ("In 
some courts, the judge will not approve your plan unless you propose paying your unsecured creditors a 
significant portion of what you owe them, usually at least 70%. The lawyers then respond by rarely or 
never submitting plans with less than the specified percentage."). 
72. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 55-61 (Revised ed. 1993). 
73. See Rowley v. Yarnall, 22 F.3d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Smith, 222 B.R. 846, 858 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 1998); In re Krull, 54 B.R. 375, 378 (Bankr. D. Col. 1985) (requiring that the debtor repay 
with all of her "projected disposable income" plus fifty percent of the amount by which her actual in-
come exceeded her disposable income). This approach was later followed in In re Riggleman, 76 B.R. 
Ill, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio !987). However, the Southern District of Ohio has since adopted the ap-
proach of In re Anderson, 21 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994). See In re Bass, 267 B.R. 812, 819 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 2001). For a more detailed description of these cases, see Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy 
in a Non-Optimal World, 44 B.C. L. REV. I, 57-68 (2002) [hereinafter Optimal Bankruptcy). 
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3. Taxation-Based Bankruptcy 
If interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, the projected dis-
posable income test would create a lump-sum tax equal to the consumer's 
projected ability to pay, and thus would not distort (but would still affect) 
the consumer's incentive to work during bankruptcy.74 However, if inter-
preted to require consumers to repay with all of their actual income in ex-
cess of their reasonably necessary expenses, Chapter 13 could impose a 
one-hundred percent marginal tax rate that would deprive consumers of the 
incentive to earn any more than their allotted expenses.75 Because of this 
concern about the consumer's work incentives, the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission 76 suggested reforms that would have replaced the pro-
jected disposable income test with a progressive tax on the consumer's ac-
tual income during the life of her Chapter 13 plan.77 Some scholars suggest 
that a taxation-based bankruptcy system should be the standard form of 
bankruptcy in the United States,78 as it is in other countries such as Austra-
l . 79 Ia. 
Beyond requiring that consumers repay with some portion of their in-
come over a fixed number of years, the details of these proposals vary. 
Some proposals would not change other important aspects of bankruptcy 
law, such as the treatment of secured claims and after-acquired property,80 
while other proposals are silent on these issues.81 By contrast, the taxation-
based bankruptcy systems currently used in other countries differ markedly 
from United States law on these matters. For example, in Australia, any 
assets that consumers acquire while they are still in bankruptcy are subject 
to attachment if they cannot claim an appropriate exemption, 82 and secured 
74. See Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 57-62. Simply put, a lump-sum tax does not "distort" 
an individual's incentive to work because she is allowed to keep the entirety of the last dollar earned; 
thus, there is no "substitution effect." However, there is a "wealth effect." The tax leaves her less 
wealthy, giving her an incentive to work harder. For a fuller description of these two effects in the con-
text of consumer bankruptcy, see id. 
75. See. e.g., NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS, FINAL REP. 
269 (1997) [hereinafter, NBRC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.Iibrary.unt.edu/nbrc/report/O I title.ht 
ml; Lynn M. LoPucki, Comnwn Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 471 (1997); 
Wang & White, supra note 35, at 256. As a matter of theory, however, one cannot conclude that a bank-
ruptcy tax rate of one-hundred percent discourages the aggregate work incentive any more than a lower 
marginal rate. The higher tax rate will certainly discourage those in bankruptcy from working. However, 
it will also provide those teetering on the edge of bankruptcy with a greater incentive to work hard and 
a void default. One cannot determine which tax rate provides better work incentives on average without 
comparing the size of these two groups. See Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 74. 
76. In 1994, Congress established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to study bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 602-03, 108 Stat. 4106,4147 (1994). 
77. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 75, at 269. 
78. See, e.g., Braucher & Mooney, supra note 24; Wang & White, supra note 35. 
79. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
80. See, e.g., Braucher & Mooney, supra note 24. 
81. See, e.g., Wang & White, supra note 35 (failing to mention the treatment of secured credit or 
after-acquired property in their proposal). 
82. See Lewis, supra note 34, at 323-24. 
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creditors largely remain free to foreclose on their collateral if they are not 
paid.83 
B. Recreating Bankruptcy's Debt Reliefwithout 
the Bankruptcy Proceeding 
Sadly, financial distress is not a recent phenomenon.84 Despite the re-
cord number of recent bankruptcy filings, some statistics suggest that finan-
cial distress may have been as common in previous generations. According 
to Professor Charles Warren, approximately seventy-five thousand Ameri-
cans were sent to debtor's prison each year in the years surrounding 1833.85 
If true, the ratio of the number of individuals sent to debtor's prison to the 
total population of the United States in 1833 is roughly equal to the ratio of 
the total number of bankruptcy filings in 2002 to the total population of the 
United States in that year.86 
While financial distress is not new, consumer bankruptcy is dramati-
cally more common than in the past. The United States lacked a lasting 
bankruptcy system until the very end of the nineteenth century,87 and bank-
ruptcy remained relatively rare for generations thereafter. Annual non-
business bankruptcy filings did not reach one hundred thousand until 
1961;88 by contrast, in 2003 there were over one-and-a-half million non-
business bankruptcy filings. 89 These statistics understate the increase in 
bankruptcies because spouses could not file a joint petition until after 
1978.90 
83. Id. at 326-28. 
84. For an excellent history of consumer credit in American history, see LENDOL CALDER, 
FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HiSTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT ( 1999). 
85. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUP'TCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 n.8 (1935). 
86. The United States population in 1833 was approximately fourteen million. U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, A6-8 
( 197 5) (reporting a population of approximately 14, 162,000). Therefore, approximately one out of every 
two hundred Americans went to debtor's prison each year. See Press Release, Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/cy02.pdf (indicating that in fiscal year 2002, 
there were over one and a half million bankruptcy filings out of a total population of about two hundred 
eighty million); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY PROFILE 2002, available at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Products/Profiles/Single/2002/ ACSffabular/0 10/0 I OOOUS l.htm (esti-
mating the 2002 population of the United States at 280,540,330). Therefore, there was approximately 
one bankruptcy filing for every two hundred individuals in 2002. 
87. The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 4. However, prior to 1898, Congress enacted three bankruptcy acts that together lasted less than 
twenty years. Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in 1803, 2 Stat. 248 (1803), the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1841 in 1843, Act of March 3, 1843,5 Stat. 614 (1843), and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in 1878, 
Act of June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). For a history of bankruptcy in the United States, see DAVID A. 
SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUP'TCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001); Charles Jordan 
Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REV. 5 (1995). 
88. DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., 1961 ANN. REP., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 211 ( 1962). 
89. There were 1,625,208 non-business bankruptcy filings in twelve months ending December 31, 
2003. See THE fEDERAL JUDICIARY, TABLE F-2 U.S. BANKRUP'TCY COURTS, at http://www.uscourts.gov 
!Press_Releases/1203f2.xls (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). 
90. For a study addressing the empirical complications created by these changes, see Ian Domowitz 
& Thomas Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Consumer Bankmptcy, 36 J.L. 
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The central positive claim of this Article is that even if the United States 
did not have a consumer bankruptcy system, the law could still grant a con-
sumer effective relief from her debts. Consider again the common elements 
of relief that consumer bankruptcy offers: (1) protection from creditor har-
assment, (2) protection from foreclosure by secured creditors, (3) protection 
of assets and income while the consumer is in bankruptcy, and (4) a dis-
charge that permanently shields the consumer's assets and income from pre-
petition creditors. Non-bankruptcy debt relief laws either provide or can be 
modified to provide close substitutes for each of these protections. 
1. Protection from Harassment 
Creditors have long relied on shaming, intimidation, or other forms of 
aggressive collection techniques to induce a defaulting debtor to repay. In 
ancient Indian and Irish society, an unpaid creditor would sit or even fast at 
the debtor's doorstep, relying on social pressure to force the debtor to re-
pay.91 Similarly, early English creditors would employ women to publicly 
chastise defaulting debtors at the debtors' place of employment,92 and today 
at least one collector in Latin America employs costumed devils and scan-
tily clad women to publicly humiliate defaulting debtors.93 Even in this 
country, some collectors use their status as "bikers" to scare debtors into 
repaying.94 Lastly, some commentators characterize the letters and phone 
calls that creditors use to ask for repayment as a form of harassment de-
signed to force repayment.95 
& EcoN. 803, 821 (1993) (estimating that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased the number of 
bankruptcy filings by twenty-two percent but noting that this estimated effect is not statistically signifi-
cant because of the very large standard error). 
91. Louis Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 229 (1917-
1918). Of course the techniques of "sitting dharna" and hunger strikes were used more recently in these 
societies, though usually as a form of protest or civil disobedience. Irish Northern Aid, Inc., Irish Hun-
ger Strikes Chapter 10 (2001), at http://www.inac.org/irishhistory/hungerstrikes/chapters/IO (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2004) (describing Celtic hunger strikes and the "sitting dhama" used in other cultures). 
92. See. e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Arm Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. 
INQUIRY 188, 195 (1984) (claiming that creditors employed women as "bawlrouts" to publicly shame a 
defaulting debtor). 
93. See Marc Lifsher, In Venezuela, If You Don't Pay Your Bills, A Devil Might Pay You a Visit, 
WALL ST. J., June 25, 2001, at AI (describing the antics of a debt collector who calls himself "Dr. 
Diablo"). 
94. See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 26-28 (describing a collection agency that 
relies on a tough biker image to convince debtors to repay). 
95. See, e.g., Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses of the Bankruptcy Sray, 45 VAND. L. REV. 71, 75 
(1992) (''Therefore, under the current automatic stay, even informal collection activities such as making 
harassing telephone calls or posting deadbeat signs on the debtor's premises are violations of the stay."); 
Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. 
Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal For Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 690 (1998) (framing a 
hypothetical, "Neither debtor owns a house. Creditors are regularly harassing both debtors with threaten-
ing telephone calls and have begun garnishing their wages."); BANKING DEPT., STATE OF NEW YORK, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/faq.htm#faqcrdtr (last visited Sept. 
26, 2004) (indicating that asking how to stop such calls is a "frequently asked question"). 
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Historically, non-bankruptcy law contained few limits on these collec-
tion techniques.96 However, the twentieth century saw an expansion of tort 
law and the rise of doctrines applicable to many forms of harassment such 
as invasion of privacy, misuse of the legal process, the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and interference with contractual relations.97 All fifty 
states have passed general consumer protection acts, and most of these laws 
are flexible enough to apply to many forms of collection abuse.98 In the 
1970s, a few states added comprehensive debt collection laws that explicitly 
prohibit harassing or deceptive collection practices and provide a private 
right of action for the debtor.99 In 1977, Congress enacted a federal version 
of a comprehensive debt collection statute, the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act, 100 and the Federal Trade Commission has enacted various regula-
tions to supplement this protection. 101 One reason that modern American 
debt collectors do not employ costumed devils or scantily clad women to 
publicly humiliate debtors is that such practices are not permitted under the 
law. 102 
This Article claims that non-bankruptcy law can provide relief equiva-
lent to that provided by a bankruptcy discharge, not that non-bankruptcy 
law currently does so. Many feel that existing non-bankruptcy limitations on 
collections activity are insufficient. For example, the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act does not apply to the original creditor, 103 and few consumers 
know that they can stop a collections agency from sending dunning letters 
by sending a written request. 104 However, scholars have suggested reforms 
that would remedy these perceived deficiencies, 105 and there is no reason 
that Congress could not enact these reforms if it so desired. 106 
96. 2 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW 438-40 (1986). 
97. See, e.g., ALPERIN &CHASE, supra note 96, at§§ 676-681; Robert M. Berger, The Bill Collector 
and the Law-A Special Ton, At Least for a While, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1968); Charles E. Hurt, 
Debt Collection Tons, 67 W.VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); William Richard Carroll, Comment, Debt Collec-
tion Practices: The Need/or Comprehensive Legislation, 15 OUQ. L. REv. 97 (1976). 
98. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 96, at 356. 
99. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788 (West 1998); ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 96, at § 632 
(collecting statutes). 
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 (1997). 
101. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 96, at 349. 
102. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 100; Graziano v. Harrison, 763 F. Supp. 
1269, 1275 (D.N.J. 1991) ("The purpose of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was to protect con-
sumers from unfair, deceptive and harassing collection practices while leaving collectors free to employ 
efficient, reasonable and ethical practices in pursuit of their profession."); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Collection 
and Credit Agencies § 15 (2003) (explaining that a debt collector can be liable for "extreme and outra-
geous conduct in attempting to collect a debt"). 
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2000) (excluding original creditors from the definition of debt collec-
tor). 
104. See, e.g., Elwin Griffith, The Search for More Fairness in the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 555-57 (2003) (arguing that collectors should have to inform the consumer 
that they can stop the dunning letters, thus implying that consumers generally do not know about this 
right). 
105. /d. at 555-63. 
106. This Article does not claim that Congress should enact further limitations on creditor collec-
tions, only that it is possible. 
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2. Forestalling Foreclosure 
The most frequently used form of American consumer bankruptcy, 
Chapter 7, provides consumers with little protection against secured credi-
tors. Generally, consumers lack the cash necessary to redeem collateral,107 
and the automatic stay typically adds only a minor delay to the foreclosure 
process. 108 The consumer bankruptcy systems found in other common-law 
countries offer similarly limited protection against the secured creditor; 
bankruptcy does not typically inhibit foreclosure in Australia/09 Canada, uo 
or England. Ill 
By contrast, Chapter 13 of the American Bankruptcy Code offers sub-
stantial protection against the secured creditor. First, a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy filing offers the consumer time. Consumers are able to delay foreclo-
sure through an automatic stay that could last up to five years. 112 While 
some argue that consumers abuse this power by repeatedly filing for relief 
in Chapter 13 in order to delay foreclosure indefinitely, 113 even the pending 
bankruptcy reforms would not deny the automatic stay when the consumer 
files for protection the first time. 114 Second, the consumer may be able to 
reduce the secured creditor's lien to the value of the collateral if this is less 
than the total amount that she owes. 115 
Significantly, society does not need a bankruptcy system that binds all 
of the consumer's creditors to provide either form of protection offered by 
Chapter 13. For example, nearly half of all states require that a mortgage 
holder bring an action in court in order to foreclose, 116 and the notice and 
107. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., STEPHEN ELIAS ET AL., How TO FILE FOR CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY 1/15 (lith ed. 
2004) ("If your home mortgage is in foreclosure, the automatic stay temporarily stops the proceedings. 
However, the creditor will often be able to proceed with the foreclosure sooner or later."). 
109. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 34, at 326. 
I 10. See, e.g., Ziegel, supra note 67, at 25-27 ("Canadian consumer bankruptcy law is much more 
favourable to secured creditors than is US law. There is no automatic stay in a straight bankruptcy ... 
. "); BankruptcyCanada.com, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.bankruptcycanada.com/questi 
onl.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) ("By law, all actions against a bankrupt must cease once the docu-
ments are filed. This does not apply to secured creditors such as banks holding, for example, a lien on a 
car."). 
Ill. See, e.g., GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 70, at 12-13 (explaining that under the British 
system, secured creditors can sell your home if mortgage payments are discontinued); Boshkoff, supra 
note 67, at 78 n.44 (noting that the English "receiving order" does not prevent secured creditors from 
seizing their collateral). 
112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 483, 502-03 (1997) ("The [National Bankruptcy Review] Commission received a great deal of 
testimony from debtors' attorneys asserting that many people do not file for Chapter 13 in order to 
receive a discharge; they file only for the automatic stay."). But see Susan L. DeJamatt, Once is Nor 
Enough: Preserving Consumers' Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 474-80 (1999) 
(arguing that Chapter 13 trustees do not perceive serial filings designed to delay foreclosure to be a 
significant source of bankruptcy abuse). 
114. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Cong. §§ 
302-303 (2003). 
115. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
116. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection taws, 77 VA. L. 
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procedural requirements may substantially delay foreclosure. 117 Moreover, 
many states grant the defaulting mortgagor the right to "redeem" the collat-
eral up to two years after the foreclosure sale at the price obtained in the 
foreclosure sale. 118 Most states that grant this right of redemption allow the 
mortgagor to remain in possession during this period. 119 These non-
bankruptcy "mortgagor protection laws" provide the consumer with time to 
recover financially and are often justified on the same insurance and market 
failure grounds that are used to justify the bankruptcy discharge. 120 Even if a 
state does not extend similar protections against foreclosure by other se-
cured creditors, there is no obvious reason that it could not do so. 
Society could amend non-bankruptcy law to provide something similar 
to the ability of bankrupt consumers to reduce the value of the liens against 
their property. In order to accomplish this, non-bankruptcy law would need 
to invoke a procedure in which a judge estimates the value of the collateral 
and adjusts the lien accordingly. However, this process involves only the 
claim of one creditor, and thus there is no reason that this procedure must 
bind all of a consumer's creditors. There is also no reason that this adjust-
ment must take place in a system that we would call bankruptcy. 121 Of 
course the creditor would be entitled to seek the full amount owed pursuant 
to a deficiency judgment unless prohibited by the state,122 but this would be 
an unsecured obligation that would be enforced against the consumer's 
other assets and income. 
3. Protection of Assets and Income While the Consumer 
Is in Bankruptcy 
Even before granting a discharge, bankruptcy law allows the consumer 
to retain some of her assets and income while her creditors remain unpaid. 
Non-bankruptcy law provides temporary protection as well. Defaulting con-
sumers may have their wages garnished if they do not file for bankruptcy. 
However, federal non-bankruptcy law exempts the greater of thirty times 
the federal minimum wage or seventy-five percent of the consumer's take-
home pay from garnishment and allows states to exempt even more. 123 
Some states provide further limits, 124 and a few prohibit wage garnishment 
REv. 489, 492-93 (1991 ). 
117. /d. at 493 ("Mongagees generally favor power of sale foreclosures because they are quicker and 
less costly than judicial foreclosure."). 
118. /d. at 495. 
119. !d. 
120. /d. 
121. See Radin, supra note 5 (describing bankruptcy as a process that binds all of a debtor's credi-
tors). 
122. See Schill, supra note 116, at 494-95 (describing limits on deficiency judgments). 
123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2002) (exempting the greater of thiny times the federal minimum 
wage or seventy-five percent of the debtor's take-home pay). 
124. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4913 (2003) (exempting eighty-five percent of earned but 
unpaid wages); 740 ILL COMP. STAT. 170/4 (2004) (exempting the greater of eighty-five percent of 
earned but unpaid weekly wages or fony-five times the Federal minimum hourly wage). 
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entirely .125 Thus, consumers are able to shield most, and in some cases all, 
of their income from their creditors, and society can increase the amount of 
income protected by simply amending these statutes. 
For the most part, the consumer may use the same asset exemptions 
outside of bankruptcy that she may use inside of bankruptcy. The Bank-
ruptcy Code gives the consumer the choice between certain bankruptcy-
specific exemptions found in § 522(d) of the Code and the exemptions 
available to her under state law and non-bankruptcy federal law. 126 How-
ever, the Code also gives each state the right to deny their residents this 
choice and insist that their residents use the state and non-bankruptcy fed-
eral exemptions. 127 The vast majority of states chose to "opt-out" of the § 
522(d) exemptions within the first few years of the enactment of this 
choice,128 and many of the states that did not choose to opt-out of this sys-
tem have non-bankruptcy exemptions that are so generous that the availabil-
ity of the federal exemptions in § 522(d) has little practical significance. 129 
Even if a state has opted out of the § 522(d) exemptions, there may be 
some difference in the ability of its residents to exempt assets inside and 
outside of bankruptcy. Some states that chose to opt-out of the federal ex-
emptions enacted state exemptions that can only be used in bankruptcy/30 
but these states are few in number. A more significant difference is that the 
bankrupt consumer need only store her wealth in exempt form at the time of 
filing. In other words, the consumer who does not file for bankruptcy faces 
a continuous threat of attachment if she ever holds a non-exempt asset, such 
as cash in her savings account. 131 Of course, this distinction would matter 
little if the exemptions were sufficiently generous so that few consumers 
would face a realistic chance of attachment. Moreover, there is no reason 
that bankruptcy must treat exemptions in this manner. Other nations have 
bankruptcy proceedings that span a number of years, and creditors remain 
free to attach any non-exempt asset that a consumer acquires during this 
time. 132 In addition, courts could invoke strict limits on pre-bankruptcy 
planning, 133 and thereby limit the ability of the debtor to take advantage of 
125. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 8217 (2002) (prohibiting wage garnishment in favor of general 
creditors); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(l) (2000) (prohibiting wage garnishment in favor of 
general creditors). 
126. II U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000). 
127. /d. 
128. See Political Economy, supra note 12, at 26-27. 
129. /d. 
130. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.66(A)(4)(a), (A)(l7) (West 2003); CAL. CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE§ 703.140 (2004). 
131. Some states do provide specific exemptions for bank deposits. See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. 
LAW§ 283(2) (2001) (exempting up to $2,500 in bank deposits). Other states provide exemptions that 
can be used to protect a limited amount of any property. See, e.g .• ALA. CoDE § 6-10-6 (1975) (exempt-
ing $3,000 of personal property). 
132. See, e.g., Boshkoff, supra note 67, at 82 (noting that an English bankruptcy court can reach the 
debtor's post-petition earnings); Lewis, supra note 34, at 323-24 (noting that the Australian bankruptcy 
court can reach property the debtor receives after filing but prior to discharge). 
133. This Article does not necessarily advocate strong limits on pre-bankruptcy planning. For articles 
addressing this issue, see Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their 
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the fact that American bankruptcy only measures the debtor's non-exempt 
assets at one instant. 
This Article does not argue that current non-bankruptcy law protects a 
sufficient amount of the consumer's assets or income; the point is simply 
that both federal and state governments can protect the consumer's assets 
and income and thereby make bankruptcy less necessary. In fact, one of the 
primary arguments made in support of the federal limitations on garnish-
ment was that these limitations would remove many poor debtors from 
bankruptcy. 134 
4. Providing a Fresh Start 
Perhaps the most critical difference between a consumer who receives a 
bankruptcy discharge and a consumer with no assets or income that her 
creditors can attach is that in the latter case the consumer's obligations re-
main outstanding. Even if a consumer's current income and assets are ex-
empt, the consumer may have little incentive to save and acquire new assets 
or to work hard and increase her earnings if these assets and earnings will 
not also be protected. That is, non-bankruptcy law may provide only tempo-
rary protection, and the consumer may continue to live under a "debt-
overhang" that robs her of her will to work hard and to save. 135 A discharge 
can remove this debt-overhang and give the consumer a fresh start that will 
return her to productive society. 136 
Even if debts remained outstanding forever, they would not create a 
significant debt-overhang if there is little chance that the consumer will ever 
earn or save enough to have non-exempt assets or income. Therefore, non-
bankruptcy law could overcome the overhang problem simply by enacting 
larger exemptions or otherwise making the enforcement of debts more diffi-
cult. Earlier generations of consumer finance scholars, writing when con-
sumer bankruptcy was far less common, advocated severe limitations on 
non-bankruptcy debt collections as a way of providing debt relief. In fact, 
some scholars argued that the law should refuse to enforce debts, or at least 
Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of Fresh Stan?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235 (1995). But 
see Juliet M. Moringiello, Distinguishing Hogs from Pigs: A Proposal for a Preference Approach to 
Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 103, 140 (1998) (arguing that "[a] preference 
approach to pre-bankruptcy planning would further the desirable goal of uniformity in the bankruptcy 
laws and would provide some certainty to courts and to debtors' attorneys"). 
134. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 721 (1967) (Vern 
Countryman arguing for limitations on garnishment to "relieve the Federal bankruptcy system of the 
burden of cases ... filed only to avoid garnishment"). 
135. Note, however, that some economists now suggest that consumers would, on average, work 
more if no discharge existed because they would have an incentive to work hard and repay their debts. 
See, e.g., IGOR LIVSHITS ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: A FRESH START (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Research Department, Working Paper No. 617, 2002) (suggesting that the bankruptcy 
discharge may reduce the consumer's incentive to work). 
136. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934). 
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unsecured debts. 137 Though this sounds extreme, one must be careful when 
describing how this proposal differs from a freely available discharge. This 
is addressed in Part ill. 
Non-bankruptcy law has a less extreme measure for addressing the 
overhang problem: the statute of limitations. 138 At one time, a claim dis-
charged in bankruptcy had roughly the same legal status as a claim on 
which the statute of limitations had run. Both could be reaffirmed without 
further consideration, 139 and the consumer had to plead each as an affmna-
tive defense in a suit brought by a creditor to enforce the debt. 140 Today, the 
consumer who wishes to reaffirm a debt in bankruptcy must comply with 
certain procedural requirements, 141 and the discharge serves as an injunction 
against further collections so the consumer will not have to plead it as an 
affirmative defense.142 These changes to bankruptcy law are quite signifi-
cant. However, it would be a mistake to claim that the changes are critical 
for bankruptcy relief; our system of bankruptcy operated without them for 
over seventy years, about two-thirds of its existence.143 Moreover, society 
could alter the effect of the statute of limitations to more closely track that 
of the discharge. For example, the Fair Debts Collection Practices Act now 
prohibits bill collectors from invoking judicial remedies on a debt on which 
the statute of limitations has run, 144 and society could expand the scope of 
this prohibition so that it mimics the injunction that accompanies a bank-
ruptcy discharge. Similarly, society could change non-bankruptcy law so 
that reaffirmations of debts barred by the statute of limitations would be 
unenforceable unless consumers complied with whatever procedures were 
deemed necessary to protect them. 
Statutes of limitations vary with the type of the claim; for written con-
tracts they can be as long as fifteen years. 145 However, a few states have 
limitation periods that are within the three to five years 146 that it may take an 
137. See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 301-
04 (1974) (effectively calling for the abolishment of formal remedies for unsecured credit); ARCHffiALD 
RossER, CREDIT PERNICIOUS 31-43 (1823) (arguing that courts should not enforce consumer debts as 
defined by the amount borrowed). 
138. The relationship between the bankruptcy discharge and the statute of limitations is largely 
unexplored in the literature. For an article raising the issue, see, for example, Discussion, 41 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 123, 125 (1977) (noting that a discharge and a statute of limitations raise similar issues 
and calling for further study). 
139. See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 227 (1825). 
140. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 87, at 35. 
141. II U.S.C. § 524(c) (2000). 
142. /d. § 524(a)(2). 
143. The effect of a bankruptcy discharge was changed in 1970. Dischargeability Act, Pub. L. No. 
467, 84 Stat. 990 ( 1970). 
144. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(f) (West 2003); Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 
(1987) ("The court agrees with Kimber that a debt collector's filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to 
be time-barred ... is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt."). 
145. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.090 (Michie 2002). For a collection of state statutes of 
limitation, see CardReport.com, Statute Of Limitations For Debt, at http://www.cardreport.comJlaws/stat 
ute-of-limitations.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). 
146. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 5-216 (Michie 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-511 (Supp. 2002); VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 8.01-246 (Michie 2003). 
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American consumer to complete a Chapter 13 repayment plan or an Austra-
lian147 or British148 consumer to obtain a bankruptcy discharge. If the con-
sumer has no assets or income that a creditor can attach, a creditor may 
simply give up, and his claim will eventually be barred by this limitation. 
Some creditors will sue and obtain a judgment, and at common law a 
judgment could survive indefinitely, though it might become dormant if the 
creditor did not take sufficient action to enforce it within a year and a half of 
its signing. 149 Today, however, every state but Delaware has a statute that 
causes a judgment to expire after a term of years. 150 Some might worry that 
Delaware provides an exception that swallows the rule since so many credit 
card issuers are based there. 151 However, even if the creditor could sue the 
consumer in Delaware, the creditor would still need to domesticate its 
judgment in the consumer's home state because that is where the con-
sumer's assets are found. 152 Therefore, the statute of limitations imposed by 
the consumer's home state would govern. 
Note that the statute of limitations for judgments does not merely catch 
the idle creditor. Unlike a statute of limitations on a claim, a statute of limi-
tations can run on a judgment even if the creditor is actively trying to en-
force it. In fact, many states insist that all acts required to enforce the judg-
ment be completed before the statute of limitations expires, and some credi-
tors have seen their judgment expire even though a foreclosure sale had 
taken place and the only remaining required act was a judicial confirmation 
of sale. 153 
This Article does not claim that non-bankruptcy law currently uses stat-
utes of limitations to replicate the effect of a bankruptcy discharge, only that 
it can. The statute of limitations for judgments can be quite long; many 
states provide that a judgment will survive for up to twenty years. 154 More-
over, the vast majority of states allow a creditor to renew or revive a judg-
ment an unlimited number of times so that a judgment could, in theory, re-
main outstanding forever. 155 Yet if a true debt-overhang exists (that is, if the 
147. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 34, at 318 ("Finally, like chapter 13, the typical period until dis-
charge in Australia is three years."). 
148. See, e.g., Boshkoff, supra note 67, at 87 (noting that many more debtors receive a discharge five 
years after filing for bankruptcy than receive a discharge immediately after filing). Note, however, that 
England recently passed legislation that would provide most bankrupt debtors with a discharge after only 
one year. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.). The portion of this legislation governing consumer 
insolvency became effective in April, 2004. See id. 
149. See THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6.79, 6-227 
(2002); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical Inventory 
and Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 172 (1957). 
150. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 969 (2003) (explaining that judgments expire after a certain 
time period). 
151. See Comment, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.: Charging Toward Deregulation in the 
Credit Card Industry, 22 DEL J. CORP. L. 601, 628 n.221 (1997) (noting that "[f]ive of the ten largest 
credit card issuers in the nation are located in Delaware .... "). 
152. See CRANDALL, supra note 149, at 6-227. 
153. See, e.g., Hazel v. VanBeek, 954 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Wa. 1998). 
154. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 6-2-32 (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 55.081 (2003). 
155. See CRANDALL, supra note 149, at 6-226 to -234. Whether the debtor renews or revives his 
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consumer is unlikely to ever repay all her debts in full), it is unlikely that 
the more junior claimants will take the trouble to revive their judgments. 
Note that the possibility of using short, and non-renewable, statutes of 
limitations to replicate the effect of a bankruptcy discharge is not entirely 
hypothetical. A few states currently provide fairly short, and in some cases 
non-renewable, time limits on judgments. Some states provide periods for 
enforcing judgments that are as low as four 156 or five 157 years. More signifi-
cantly, a few states allow a creditor to renew a Judgment only once so that 
there is an absolute time limit on a judgment. 15 Admittedly, each of these 
states allows the original judgment to last ten years159 so that a diligent 
creditor can retain his judgment for up to twenty years. However, at least 
one of these states once had a five-year limitation, 160 or about the length that 
the pending bankruptcy legislation would force high-income consumers to 
stay in Chapter 13 before receiving a discharge. 161 Again, this Article does 
not claim that current non-bankruptcy law relief is equivalent to that offered 
by the Bankruptcy Code. This article claims only that non-bankruptcy law 
could be reformed to provide such relief. 
Finally, the statute of limitations on judgments does not act as a blun-
derbuss that strikes all judgments regardless of their nature. Like the bank-
ruptcy discharge, the statute of limitations may exempt some judgments 
based on the underlying claim for relief. For example, some states have 
statutes of limitations that provide special treatment for debts arising from 
family law, 162 or from willful damage to property, 163 and there seems little 
reason that these statutes could not be modified to more closely match the 
exceptions to the bankruptcy discharge. 
The functional equivalence between a very short statute of limitations 
on judgments with no possibility of renewal and a bankruptcy discharge 
may raise constitutional issues if a state enacts such a statute of limita-
tions. 164 However, there is no reason why the federal government could not 
judgment may have an impact on his priority against other creditors, but this detail is not necessary for 
this Article. 
156. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 5525 (2002). 
157. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-2403 (Supp. 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-17-307 (Michie 2003). 
158. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-20-35 (2003) (requiring the cancellation of all judgments or renewals 
after twenty years); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.360(1) (2003) (limiting a judgment lien to ten years with one 
renewal permitted); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 4.56.210(1), (3), 6.17.020(3) (West 1989) (limiting a 
judgment lien to ten years with one renewal permitted). 
159. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-20-35 (2003); OR. REV. STAT.§ 18.360 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 6.17.020(I)(West 1989). 
160. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 427.030 (Michie 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1270(2) (2003); WYO. 
STAT. ANN.§ l-20-106b (Michie 2003). 
161. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, supra note 47, § 318. 
162. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CoDE§ 4.56.210(2) (West 1989) (providing that a judgment lien for child 
support survives until ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child for whom support is 
ordered). 
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09 (2003) (providing that judgments for willful damage to property 
are not cancelled by the general statute of limitations on judgments). 
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. A state-created discharge that applies to debts incurred prior to the 
enactment of the discharge has been held to violate the Contracts Clause. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). Even a discharge that applies only prospectively may run afoul of the Full 
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enact such a limit. If the federal government can limit the percentage of 
income that a state court can garnish and the types of property that the state 
court can attach, the federal government could limit the number of years 
that this income can be garnished. Of course, the federal limitations on gar-
nishment were enacted in part with reference to the federal government's 
bankruptcy powers, 165 and such a statute of limitations may be enacted pur-
suant to this power as well. However, we do not consider garnishment pro-
ceedings as "bankruptcy" merely because the percentage of income that a 
creditor may claim is regulated pursuant to Congress's bankruptcy power, 
and we would not consider these proceedings as "bankruptcy" merely be-
cause their duration was regulated pursuant to this same power. 
C. Procedural Bankruptcy 
Perhaps there are two critical aspects of consumer bankruptcy that non-
bankruptcy law cannot effectively replicate. First, bankruptcy may be better 
able to distribute scarce proceeds when no creditor will be repaid in full. 
Second, bankruptcy, or at least voluntary bankruptcy, places considerable 
power in the hands of the consumer by allowing her to decide when to ad-
mit failure. Yet even if one decides that these distinctions are significant, 
they do not justify our current system because society can accommodate 
these goals within a bankruptcy system that provides the consumer with 
roughly the same relief that she would have received under non-bankruptcy 
law. 
1. Distribution of Proceeds 
Much of the bankruptcy literature is comprised of an on-going debate 
between the "Traditionalists" and the "Proceduralists" over the extent to 
which bankruptcy law should respect non-bankruptcy entitlements. 166 The 
Traditionalists argue that non-bankruptcy collections law is designed to 
resolve the conflict between a single creditor and a debtor who refuses to 
repay and that bankruptcy plays a unique role in determining how an insol-
vent debtor's assets will be distributed when there are insufficient assets to 
pay all creditors in full. 167 Because Traditionalists believe that bankruptcy 
Faith and Credit Clause if it applies to the debt of foreign citizens. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat) 213, 368-69 (1827). Moreover, such a discharge could well be preempted by the existing Bank-
ruptcy Code. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261,265 (1929). 
165. Consumer Credit Protection Act§ 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (2003) ("Congress determines that 
the provisions of this subchapter are necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the 
powers of the Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws."). 
166. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998-99); Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 2004). 
167. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 782 ("State collection law swings into action on the complaint 
of a single creditor, and it provides that creditor an avenue to pursue payment of the obligation owed to 
it. In enforcing the rights of one creditor, state collection law does not address the possible consequence 
that the collection will render the debtor unable to pay its remaining creditors."). 
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plays a unique role in addressing financial collapse, they argue that bank-
ruptcy need not follow non-bankruptcy priorities. 
The Proceduralists counter that non-bankruptcy law is in fact designed 
to determine how an insolvent debtor's assets should be distributed when 
there are insufficient assets to repay all creditors in full; non-bankruptcy law 
does this through its various priority rules. 168 As a result, the Proceduralists 
argue that one must find a further purpose to explain the existence of bank-
ruptcy law, and that bankruptcy law should deviate from the priorities estab-
lished under non-bankruptcy law only to the extent necessary to achieve this 
purpose. They generally argue that this purpose is to resolve a collective 
action problem among general creditors that could reduce the aggregate 
amount collected from the insolvent debtor. According to these scholars, 
non-bankruptcy law's reliance on a first-come, first-served priority system 
for general creditors creates a potential "race to the assets" that may result 
in the premature and piecemeal liquidation of a corporation that fails to 
maximize the repayment of all creditors.169 Bankruptcy helps solve this col-
lective action problem by distributing any available proceeds pro rata 
among the general creditors, thus lessening the incentive to liquidate 
early.t?o 
The debate between the Proceduralists and the Traditionalists focuses 
on business bankruptcies, 171 and some scholars have doubted the applicabil-
ity of this race to the assets theory in the consumer setting. 172 Unlike a firm, 
a consumer is not liquidated, and these scholars argue that the consumer 
will "go on as before" even if one creditor rushes in and seizes most of the 
consumer's assets. 173 As a matter of theory, however, this skepticism may 
be unwarranted. The premature seizure of some assets, such as tools of the 
trade, may imperil the consumer's ability to work and earn income that 
could be used to repay creditors as a group. For example, if the consumer 
loses her automobile, she may be unable to drive to work. Moreover, com-
mentators have long argued that if one or more creditors brings a garnish-
ment order against the consumer's employer, her employer may dismiss the 
168. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 6, at 822 ("Many laws, from UCC Article 9 to ERISA, concern 
themselves with distributing such losses. Nonbankruptcy priority rules distribute losses and will continue 
to do so regardless of whether a special set of bankruptcy priority rules exists."). 
169. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 861-68. 
170. !d. This is, of course, a drastically simplified version of the debate. 
171. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 776-77 ("In order to join issue more clearly and to narrow the 
focus of the debate somewhat, Professor Baird and I have agreed to debate the basis of bankruptcy 
policy in the context of business bankruptcies."). 
172. On the other hand, scholars have pointed out that non-bankruptcy law can preempt much of the 
race to the assets problem in the business context by assigning rights to the debtor's assets in advance 
through security interests. See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992). 
173. See Adler et al., supra note 59, at 586 ("[l]f there is a collective action problem, it must take a 
different form than it takes for business bankruptcy. To see why, suppose there were no bankruptcy 
procedure and one creditor rushed to judgment, seizing most of the insolvent consumer's assets. This 
would injure the other creditors, but the injury is only a wealth transfer. As just said, the consumer will 
go on as before, whether one creditor takes the lion's share or the creditors share ratably."). 
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consumer to avoid the necessary paperwork or because the employer will 
view the employee as untrustworthy. 174 Obviously, the loss of employment 
imperils any repayment. Non-bankruptcy law partially addresses these diffi-
culties. Many states exempt tools of the trade from attachment,175 and fed-
eral and state laws prohibit the termination of an emplolee on the grounds 
that a garnishment order has been entered against her. 17 Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of these laws is untested; even the assertion that garnishment 
leads to job loss rests solely on anecdotal evidence. It is at least possible, 
however, that a race to judgment could lessen aggregate collections. 
Rather than revisit the debate over the conceptual validity of the race to 
the assets theory, this Article notes that neither the Proceduralist nor the 
Traditionalist explanations can have much importance in the overwhelming 
majority of Chapter 7 non-business bankruptcies because there are no pro-
ceeds to distribute to general creditors. 177 The consumer will, on occasion, 
reaffirm a loan from a secured creditor and may even reaffirm a loan from 
an unsecured creditor,178 but these reaffirmations are typically based on a 
desire to keep a particular asset, avoid litigation, or keep a credit line open 
after bankruptcy and thus have nothing to do with the race to the assets 
problem. In short, the need to better distribute proceeds to creditors cannot 
explain why the vast majority of bankrupt consumers are in bankruptcy 
since there are no proceeds to distribute. 
2. Letting the Consumer Declare Default 
The ftrst bankruptcy system enacted in the United States did not allow 
the debtor to voluntarily ftle a petition for relief, 179 but many debtors were 
able to convince a friendly creditor to file a petition for them. 180 Today, the 
voluntary petition seems to be a staple of bankruptcy. The consumer's abil-
ity to voluntarily ftle for relief may confer important benefits that would be 
difficult to replicate using non-bankruptcy law. Under non-bankruptcy law 
there are separate statutes of limitations for claims and for judgments, and 
by waiting until just before the statute of limitations runs before suing, a 
creditor could maximize the period in which the consumer's income and 
assets are subject to the threat of attachment and delay the fresh start. Of 
174. For example. prior to enacting federal limitations on wage garnishment, Congress asserted that 
hundreds of workers lose their jobs as a result of garnishment proceedings because their wages are 
garnished by "unscrupulous merchants" and lenders whose practices "trap the tmwitting workers." H.R. 
REP. No. 90-1040 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1966 (quoting the President's recom-
mendations on urban and rural poverty, H.R. Doc. No. 90-88, 10 (1967)). 
175. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Supp. 2003) (exempting tools, books, and instruments of 
trade up to $10,000 if needed in occupation or education). 
176. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000). 
177. See supra notes 9-10. 
178. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
179. Tabb, supra note 87, at 14 ("Only creditors, upon proof of the debtor's commission of an act of 
bankruptcy, could initiate a bankruptcy."). 
180. /d. ("Debtors, however, apparently were often able to persuade a friendly creditor to bring a 
case."). 
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course, if society deems this period to be too long, it can shorten these lim-
its, though the statute of limitations on claims may need to be kept fairly 
long so that plaintiffs may discover their loss and develop their case. More-
over, the consumer may receive some emotional benefits from the finality 
that filing for bankruptcy and declaring default brings. 
Non-bankruptcy law could address these perceived problems by allow-
ing the consumer to file for a declaratory judgment of default that would 
start the statute of limitations on collections running. 181 Such an approach 
may prove quite cumbersome, however, as the consumer may need to make 
multiple filings to address her multiple creditors. A single bankruptcy filing 
is generally a more administratively efficient means of declaring general 
default. 
One should not overestimate a formal bankruptcy system's procedural 
advantages. For example, the consumer who wishes to achieve financial 
closure by declaring default may be able to do so without filing for bank-
ruptcy or invoking any court proceeding. In fact, if the consumer writes a 
letter demanding that the creditor stop further collections efforts, the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act requires that bill collectors honor this request 
except as necessary to pursue judicial action. 182 
3. Creating a Purely Procedural Bankruptcy System 
Even if the procedural advantages offered by bankruptcy are important, 
these advantages do not justify the imbalance between the relief offered 
inside and outside of bankruptcy. Society could instead adopt a largely pro-
cedural bankruptcy system that achieves these advantages and still provides 
consumers with the same level of debt relief they would have received had 
they not filed. 183 Whether society should do this, however, is discussed be-
low in Part ill. 
Imagine a bankruptcy system identical to the existing Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in terms of: (1) most procedural matters, including volun-
tary filings; (2) the treatment of secured creditors; (3) the priority of any 
distributions; and (4) the use of non-bankruptcy law to determine which of 
the consumer's assets the bankruptcy estate will claim. 184 Imagine, however, 
181. This is related to a suggestion by Professor Jackson that society could adopt a procedure 
whereby the debtor would make a public filing that would free certain assets, such as the debtor's future 
earnings, from the claims of creditors but would not serve a collecting function. See Jackson, supra note 
I, at 1396 n.8. 
182. Federal Trade Commission Facts for Consumers, Fair Debt Collection (1999), at http:/lwww.ftc 
.govlbcp/conline!pubslcredit/fdc.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) ("You can stop a debt collector from 
contacting you by writing a letter to the collector telling them to stop. Once the collector receives your 
letter, they may not contact you again except to say there will be no further contact or to notify you that 
the debt collector or the creditor intends to take some specific action."). 
183. The consumer bankruptcy system outlined in this section would be more procedural than the 
system proposed by Professor Mooney, because Professor Mooney's system would invoke different tax 
rates inside and outside of bankruptcy. See Mooney, supra note 166. 
184. As discussed above, this is not an entirely accurate description of the current Bankruptcy Code. 
See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. 
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that this procedural bankruptcy system looks to non-bankruptcy law for 
other substantive law as well. Specifically, assume that this procedural 
bankruptcy system looks to non-bankruptcy garnishment law to determine 
how much of the consumer's future income must be devoted to repaying 
pre-petition creditors and looks to the non-bankruptcy statute of limitations 
on judgments to determine how many years the consumer must make these 
payments before obtaining a discharge. 
If non-bankruptcy law set a firm statute of limitations for judgments of, 
say, three years and adopted fairly liberal exemptions from garnishment, 
this procedural bankruptcy system would be virtually indistinguishable from 
the taxation-based bankruptcy systems advocated by some scholars 185 and 
employed in some countries. 186 If non-bankruptcy law exempted the con-
sumer's income entirely and set the statute of limitations so that judgments 
had a negligible duration, this procedural bankruptcy system would resem-
ble Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
III. SHOULD CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY BE PURELY PROCEDURAL? 
Part II demonstrates that society could adopt a purely procedural bank-
ruptcy system that still offers consumers a fresh start and insures consumers 
against hardship if it is willing to offer this same relief under non-
bankruptcy law. In practice many consumers find that the existing Bank-
ruptcy Code offers substantially more generous relief than is available under 
current non-bankruptcy law; there were more than one and a half million 
non-business bankruptcy filings in 2003. 187 
Society may have valid reasons for offering consumers greater relief in 
bankruptcy than they would receive if they did not file, yet the existing lit-
erature fails to provide a plausible reason for this divergence. This Article 
argues that the divergence may be explained by expanding on the analogy 
between debt relief and insurance. 188 Bankruptcy may offer more generous 
debt relief because the bankruptcy procedure ensures that the consumer has 
suffered some misfortune and is entitled to more relief; bankruptcy confers 
greater relief because the bankruptcy process serves as a means-test. 
A. The Insufficiency of Existing Explanations 
The existing literature offers three possible justifications for why the 
law offers more debt relief in bankruptcy: (1) the debtor cooperation theory; 
(2) federalism; and (3) forgiveness. As we shall see, none of these explana-
tions are plausible. 
185. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. 
186. ld. 
187. See supra note 89. 
188. See infra notes 228-231 and accompanying text. 
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1. Debtor Cooperation Theory 
The bankruptcy discharge was first justified as a means of maximizing 
the creditor's return by rewarding the debtor for cooperating with the supe-
rior collections process found in bankruptcy. 189 Yet this justification was 
primarily used when bankruptcy was much more favorable to creditors. 190 
For example, some of the early bankruptcy laws enacted in the United 
States did not allow debtors to voluntarily file for relief, 191 and only granted 
a discharge if the debtor either paid some minimum percentage of her debts, 
obtained creditor consent, or both. 192 Moreover, the earliest bankruptcy laws 
in common-law jurisdictions were open only to merchants or traders. 193 
Perhaps debtor cooperation with the collection process was necessary be-
cause merchants could easily hide significant assets from their creditors. 
Even if we accept the debtor cooperation theory as a justification for the 
early discharge, this theory has little relevance for modem consumer bank-
ruptcy, and today scholars justify the bankruptcy discharge with other theo-
ries.194 Simply put, the most common form of bankruptcy, Chapter 7, yields 
nothing for general creditors in the overwhelming majority of bankrupt-
cies, 195 and thus one cannot credibly argue that bankruptcy maximizes 
creditor collections. 
2. Federalism 
The mixture of state and federal regulation of credit markets presents 
fertile ground for scholars of federalism. 196 Scholars typically simplify the 
analysis by characterizing bankruptcy as federal law and non-bankruptcy 
debtor-creditor law as state law. 197 Often scholars argue for a more promi-
nent role for bankruptcy (as federal law) because the states have done a poor 
job enacting non-bankruptcy debt relief laws. For example, a very large 
number of scholars have argued that the federal bankruptcy law should not 
incorporate state property exemptions because state exemption laws are 
either archaic198 or so disparate in value as to be "fundamentally unfair." 199 
189. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991). 
190. !d. 
191. !d. at 346. 
192. !d. at 346-47. 
193. !d. at 334-35. 
194. See id. at 355, 363-64. 
195. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
196. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy lAw and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEx. L. 
REV. 1381, 1402-07 (2003); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063 
(2002). 
197. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note I, at 1431. 
198. Lee Robert Bogdanoff, Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Code: Using California's New 
Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 922,932 n.70 (1984); Julia Patterson Forres-
ter, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of 
Home Equity Financing, 69 TuL. L. REV. 373, 403 n.164 (1994); Richard M. Lombino, Uniformity of 
Exemptions: Assessing the Commission's Proposals, 6 AM. BANKR.lNST. L. REV. 177, 184 (1998); Jean 
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In his seminal work on the bankruptcy discharge, Professor Jackson of-
fers a slightly different explanation for bankruptcy's more generous treat-
ment of the consumer's future income?00 According to Professor Jackson, 
the bankruptcy discharge (as federal law) may protect the consumer's hu-
man capital because the market failures that justify mandatory debt relief 
create a particular problem for human capital and these market failures are 
somehow amenable to a nationwide rule.201 
Though the extent to which the federal §ovemment should control 
debtor-creditor law remains an open question/ 2 this debate is largely or-
thogonal to the question of why bankruptcy should offer greater debt relief 
than that available under non-bankruptcy law. First, the federal government 
can, and does, regulate non-bankruptcy collections.203 Recall that the federal 
government limits garnishment to no more than twenty-five percent of an 
individual's take-home pay,204 and certainly has the power to exempt other 
assets as well.Z05 Federal non-bankruptcy law also provides limited protec-
tion against harassment by debt collectors206 and the reporting of defaults 
not associated with bankruptcy.Z07 Even if the existing federal non-
bankruptcy protections are inadequate, it is unclear why the solution to that 
problem is to offer a bankruptcy discharge rather than to strengthen these 
non-bankruptcy limitations on collections. 
A second reason why the federalism debate is orthogonal to the analysis 
of this Article is that society could adopt a bankruptcy system with more 
generous relief than available under non-bankruptcy law, and could allow 
McGreevy, Proposed Reforms in Iowa Bankruptcy Exemption Laws: A Solution to the Fraudulent Con-
veyance Dilemma, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1989); William J. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting 
Out, and Bankruptcy Refonn, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 342 (1982). See, e.g., Vern Countryman, For a New 
Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678,681-84 (1960). 
199. See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 75, at 121-25; Letter from various law professors to Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (May 22, 2002), at 
http://nacba.com/homestead.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) ("The central purpose of the Senate's 
uniform federal cap on the homestead exemption was to ameliorate the fundamental unfairness created 
when residents of one state can protect in a 'uniform' federal bankruptcy system an asset worth millions 
while residents of other states face sharp limitations on the amount of property they can protect."). 
200. See Jackson, supra note I, at 1431-33. 
201. ld. 
202. See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 227 (2000) (arguing for continued state control over exemption policies). 
203. A sharp increase in the federal control of non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor law could meet with 
significant resistance given the important role that states have historically played in this area. However, 
the federal government's power to do so would seem clear under the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion. Even if the federal government felt compelled to invoke its bankruptcy powers, as it did when it 
enacted federal limitations on wage garnishment, we would not think of these new laws as bankruptcy 
laws unless they applied to consumers who filed a bankruptcy petition. See supra notes 164-65 and 
accompanying text. 
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2002) (exempting the greater of thiny times the federal minimum wage 
or seventy-five percent of the debtor's take-home pay). 
205. Today, however, many federal exemptions are limited to assets held by narrowly defined groups 
such as federal judges. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 376(n) (2000) (exempting annuities paid to survivors of 
judges, including bankruptcy judges). 
206. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)). 
207. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-Slu (2000). 
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the states to supply the substantive law used both inside and outside of 
bankruptcy. Since the establishment of a lasting bankruptcy system in 1898, 
consumers have been able to use their state's property exemptions in bank-
ruptcy.208 The application of state property exemptions in a system of "uni-
form [l]aws on the subject of [b]ankruptcies throughout the United 
States"209 was quickly challenged in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses.210 
However, the Supreme Court upheld their application under the theory that 
bankruptcy was "geographically" uniform because creditors in each state 
were entitled to reach the same assets in bankruptcy that they could reach 
under that state's collections law.21 1 
After the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, some states 
took state control of exemptions a step further by enacting exemptions that 
would apply only in bankruptcy.212 These exemptions have also been chal-
lenged, and to date the decisions are mixed. Some courts have ruled that 
these exemptions are unconstitutional because the geographic uniformity 
argument of Hanover applies only to exemptions that are available outside 
of bankruptcy as well. 213 Others have argued that these exemptions violate 
the Supremacy Clause/14 because while Congress authorized States to opt-
out of the Section 522(d) exemptions,215 it did not specifically authorize 
them to create exemptions that would apply only in bankruptcy.216 Still 
other courts have questioned whether these bankruptcy-only exemptions 
208. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 87, at 24. 
209. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 4. 
210. 186 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1902). 
211. Hanover, 186 U.S. at 190 ("We concur in this view, and hold that the [bankruptcy] system is, in 
the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the trustee takes in each State 
whatever would have been available to the creditors if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The gen-
eral operation of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different 
States."). 
212. See, e.g., CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE§ 703.140 (2004). 
213. See In re Mata, 115 B.R. 288, 291 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Reynolds, 24 B.R. 344, 347 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). Contra In re Kulp, 949 
F.2d 1106, 1109 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1991); In reCross, 255 B.R. 25, 30-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000); In re 
Vasko, 6 B.R. 317, 319-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Shumaker, 124 B.R. 820, 825 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 1991). 
214. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
215. II U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000). 
216. Mara, 115 B.R. at 291 (''There is nothing in the Code or in the legislative history underlying its 
adoption indicating that Congress intended to delegate such authority to the various states."); Lennen, 71 
B.R at 83 ("[T]he statutory wording of section 522(b)(2)(A) that the debtor may claim property as 
exempt under 'State or local law that is applicable' should not, in view of constitutional considerations, 
be interpreted so liberally as to authorize a state exemption scheme which is applicable only in federal 
bankruptcy court."); Cross, 255 B.R at 34 ("[T]he power to forbid ... is not the same thing as having 
been given the power to create. Thus, in giving the states the ability to opt out of the federal bankruptcy 
exemptions Congress did not give them the authority to create bankruptcy exemptions."). Contra Vasko, 
6 B.R. at 320-22 (holding that the state exemptions applicable only in bankruptcy do not violate the 
Supremacy Clause); Shumaker, 124 B.R. at 826 ("Congress' enactment of§ 522(b)(l) ... was a clear 
'signal' to each state, in accordance with the geographic uniformity doctrine, that each state could val-
idly adopt its own bankruptcy exemption scheme."). Moreover, some courts have questioned whether 
Congress could delegate the right to set bankruptcy-only exemptions even if it wanted to. See, e.g., 
Reynolds, 24 B.R. at 346 ("To hold otherwise would permit an evasion or annulment of the federal 
bankruptcy laws indirectly that would not be countenanced directly since the Congress did not delegate 
its bankruptcy powers, assuming such could be done."). 
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violate the Equal Protection Clause because the exemptions are unavailable 
to consumers who do not file for bankruptcy.217 Regardless, a great many 
courts have upheld these statutes,218 including the only appellate court to 
have addressed this issue.219 
If Congress may delegate to the states the power to set property exemp-
tions that apply only in bankruptcy, there seems little reason why it could 
not adopt a bankruptcy system that applied some sort of tax on the con-
sumer's future earnings and then delegate to the states the right to set the 
rate of this tax as well as its duration. That is, there seems little reason why 
the states could not supply all (or virtually all) of the needed substantive law 
in bankruptcy. Again, this Article does not argue that Congress should do 
this, only that it could. 
3. Forgiveness 
A few scholars eschew the sterile language of insurance when discuss-
ing the bankruptcy discharge in favor of the more emotive language of mo-
rality and forgiveness.220 According to this literature, forgiveness requires 
certain preconditions: "there must be a wrong committed, the wrong must 
harm another, the wronged party resents what occurred, and the wrongdoer 
acknowledges the wrong done and takes steps to rectify it."221 This theory 
could explain why the consumer is given greater debt relief in bankruptcy 
than she may receive under non-bankruptcy law if the bankruptcy filing 
serves as the consumer's acknowledgement of her wrongdoing.222 
Even if forgiveness theory justifies debt relief223 and forgiveness is only 
appropriate after consumers acknowledge their wrong,224 forgiveness theory 
217. See, e.g., Reynolds, 24 B.R. at 347 ("(T]he Ohio statute either enacts special bankruptcy legisla-
tion or enacts legislation violative of Article IV, Section 2 (Privileges and Immunities Clause) and the 
Equal Protection Clause, Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution."). Contra Bloom, 5 B.R. at 
453; Shumaker, 124 B.R. at 826; Vasko, 6 B.R. at 323 (citing Bloom, 5 B.R. at 453). 
218. See supra notes 213-17. 
219. In re Kulp, 949 F.2d 1106, 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). 
220. See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS (1997); Richard E. Hint, Bankruptcy 
Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 515 (1991); Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reas-
sessment of Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (2003); Terrence L. Michael & Michael R. 
Pacewicz, Settling Objections to Discharge in Bankruptcy Cases: An Unsettling Look at Very Unsettled 
Law, 37 TULSA L. REV. 637 (2002); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, 
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986). 
221. See GROSS, supra note 220, at 93 (citing JORAM GRAFHABER, FORGIVENESS 32 (1991)). 
222. ld. at 94 ("Finally, debtors admit to failure and take steps to redress their wrong by accessing the 
legal system. The system makes that wrong a matter of public record and requires the debtors to submit 
to judicial scrutiny."). 
223. Some scholars question the link between the moral and legal obligations to repay debts. See, 
e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513 (2000) (noting that 
many religions and cultures have a legal forgiveness of debts but that this forgiveness does not discharge 
the moral obligation to repay if the debtor's circumstances subsequently improve). 
224. For example, some religions view repentance as a prerequisite for forgiveness while others do 
not. See MICHAEL E. MCCULWUGH, KENNETH I. PARGAMENT & CARL E. THORESEN, FORGIVENESS 32-
35 (2000). 
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cannot explain why society offers greater relief in bankruptcy than under 
non-bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy serves neither as an acknowledgement of 
the consumer's debt nor as an acknowledgement that the consumer commit-
ted a wrong by not repaying the debt. Even if a consumer vigorously denies 
her liability to a given creditor, this creditor will still have a claim in the 
consumer's bankruptcy, albeit a disputed and unliquidated claim.225 The 
bankruptcy discharge will bar any further efforts by the creditor to establish 
the consumer's personal liability for this claim,226 and the consumer need 
not ever acknowledge the claim's validity. In fact, some scholars argue that 
consumers can, and should, use bankruptcy as the ultimate weapon in their 
effort to settle disputed claims.227 In short, one simply cannot say that bank-
ruptcy serves as an acknowledgment of the consumer's obligation. Because 
bankruptcy provides no acknowledgement of the consumer's obligation, this 
theory of forgiveness does not explain why society offers greater relief in 
bankruptcy. 
B. Does Bankruptcy Serve as a "Means-Test"? 
Perhaps the justification for giving the consumer greater debt relief in 
bankruptcy can be found by returning to the justifications for giving the 
consumer any debt relief at all. Although there are competing theories,228 
the most plausible justification for the bankrugtcy discharge is that it pro-
vides the consumer with a form of insurance2 that the consumer failed to 
purchase due to some form of market failure.Z30 Like insurance, bankruptcy 
provides a benefit (debt relieD when the consumer has suffered some hard-
225. II U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000). See Baird, supra note 72, at 79-87, for an especially understandable 
treatment of this issue. 
226. II U.S.C. § 524 (2000). 
227. See, e.g .. William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as 
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 
401-04 ( 1994) (arguing that bankruptcy may be a useful tool for settling disputed claims). 
228. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 1, at 50-52 (reviewing the literature); Tabb, supra note 1, at 56-57 
(reviewing the literature). 
229. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 59, at 587 ("As it happens, consumer bankruptcy is best justi-
fied as partial wage insurance .... ");Hallinan, supra note I, passim; Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 
supra note 32, at 252-61 (discussing the relationship between bankruptcy and other forms of social 
insurance); Wang & White, supra note 35, at 255 ("An important function of personal bankruptcy is to 
provide partial wealth insurance for risk-averse debtors by discharging some debt when debtors' ability 
to repay turns out to be low."). Note, however, that a growing number of economists question whether 
the insurance that bankruptcy provides improves consumer welfare. See, e.g., Karlik B. Athreya, Welfare 
Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 49 l. MONETARY ECON. 1567 (2002) (finding a 
large increase in welfare from the complete elimination of bankruptcy); Kartik B. Athreya & Nicole B. 
Simpson, Personal Bankruptcy or Public Insurance? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper 
No. 03-14, 2003) (suggesting that consumer welfare would be improved if bankruptcy laws were made 
significantly less generous); Satyajit Chatteljel et al., A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer 
Credit With Risk of Default (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-6, 2002) (finding a 
large increase in welfare from a ban on Chapter 7 filings by debtors with above median income). But see 
LIVSHITS ET AL., supra note 135 (finding that the bankruptcy discharge may increase or decrease con-
sumer welfare depending on the assumptions made). 
230. See Richard M. Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. 
L. & ECON. REv. 68 (2002), for a discussion of the failures that can afflict credit markets. 
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ship, and the consumer pays premiums for this insurance in the form of 
higher interest rates.231 
Part II of this Article demonstrates that the insurance justification for 
the bankruptcy discharge remains incomplete because other limitations on 
collections may provide debt relief and thus may provide the insurance that 
the consumer fails to purchase in the market. However, by focusing our 
attention on the moral hazards that insurance creates, the analogy to insur-
ance may help us understand bankruptcy's proper role within a larger sys-
tem of debt relief. 
When discussing moral hazard, consumer finance literature tends to fo-
cus on the fact that insurance will lessen the individual's incentive to avoid 
the harm that is insured against. 232 In doing so, the literature often speaks in 
more colorful terms: just as the grasshopper fails to plan for the coming 
winter, the insured may fail to guard against misfortune if her insurance will 
lessen the pain of her loss-the "grasshopper problem."233 In the debt relief 
context the grasshopper spends more money than she can repay, fails to 
purchase sufficient health insurance, or behaves in a manner that results in 
unemployment. 
Unfortunately, the grasshopper problem is unlikely to help us under-
stand bankruptcy's role in a larger system of debt relief. In theory, a bank-
ruptcy proceeding could solve the grasshopper problem directly by denying 
relief to all consumers who did not take sufficient care to avoid financial 
distress.234 Faced with the loss of insurance, a rational individual would take 
the right amount of care to avoid the loss and there would be no grasshopper 
problem. In fact, the bankruptcy laws of England have long given a bank-
ruptcy judge the discretion to deny a discharge if the consumer "has brought 
on, or contributed to, his bankruptcy by rash and hazardous speculations, or 
by unjustifiable extravagance in living, or by gambling, or by culpable ne-
glect of his business affairs."235 
Of course, the ability of a bankruptcy court to solve the grasshopper 
problem by denying relief when the consumer does not take sufficient care 
to avoid financial distress is just another manifestation of the standard result 
231. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note I, at 103-05. 
232. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 59 (discussing the effect that various aspects of bankruptcy law 
have on a debtor's incentive to avoid financial distress). 
233. Several prominent bankruptcy scholars have used the story of the ant and the grasshopper to 
explain the moral hazard created by bankruptcy. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 219-20; 
LoPucki, supra note 75, at 464; Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1084 
(1998). In Aesop's fable of the ant and the grasshopper, the grasshopper plays the summer away while 
the ant toils to save for winter. There are numerous versions of this fable and they differ largely on how 
the grasshopper is treated in the winter. See, e.g., JACOB LAWRENCE, AESOP'S FABLES (1998). 
234. While scholars have not advocated this approach generally, some have suggested that consumers 
who seek relief in Chapter 13 should be barred from modifying their plan of repayment after further 
hardship if they could have prevented this hardship. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Stan for 
the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 59, 148 (1986). 
235. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59,§ 26(3) (Eng.). For a description of bankruptcy in 
England, see Boshkoff, supra note 67. 
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that a well-constructed negligence standard will induce consumers to take 
the proper level of care. If an individual could insure against the conse-
quences of her negligence, her incentive to take this care would be reduced 
or eliminated.236 Yet a system that denies consumers the ability to insure 
against their own negligence would leave them with an unacceptably high 
level of risk. Courts may incorrectly label reasonable behavior as negligent, 
and consumers are sometimes unable to hold themselves to the reasonable 
level of care mandated by the courts. 237 Therefore, since at least the begin-
ning of the twentieth century American law has allowed238-and in the case 
of automobile liability insurance, generally requirecf39 -consumers to in-
sure against negligent behavior. Similarly, public insurance programs (such 
as unemployment insurance) typically provide relief for the consequences of 
negligent misbehavior40 and, unsurprisingly, American debt relief laws 
give relief to the consumer whose negligent financial management has 
d h 0 1 241 cause er mso vency. 
The insured who suffers too many losses will be unable to get further 
coverage at an affordable cost. Likewise, the consumer who defaults too 
frequently will be unable to borrow-at least at an affordable interest rate. 
Insurers can further address the grasshopper problem by limiting the relief 
provided. For example, insurance policies frequently require a co-payment 
so that the grasshopper experiences at least some of the consequences of her 
negligence. Similarly, society can control the grasshopper problem by mak-
ing the consequences of default more painful. However, society can use 
both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law to make default painful, and thus 
this form of moral hazard provides little guidance for our inquiry. 
This Article focuses on a second form of moral hazard. Just as the opos-
sum plays dead to ward off predators, the insured may exaggerate her mis-
fortune in order to maximize her relief-the "opossum problem." In private 
insurance markets, the opossum files false claims. In the public assistance 
context, the opossum refuses to work a reasonable amount to support her-
self, and instead lives off of the public. Similarly, in the debt relief context, 
the opossum feigns financial death even though she has the means to repay 
some or all of her debts without undue hardship. 
This Article argues that if there is a reason to offer the consumer greater 
relief in bankruptcy than under non-bankruptcy law, it is that the bankruptcy 
236. See. e.g., Steven Shave!l, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 211 (1987). 
237. Id. at 212 (suggesting this difficulty partially explains our ability to insure against our own 
negligence). 
238. See. e.g., Breeden v. Frankford Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119 S.W. 576 (Mo. 
1909). 
239. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221 (4th ed. 1998) ("Automobile 
liability insurance is now almost universal, although this is partly because states required drivers to buy 
insurance or present equivalent evidence of financial responsibility for accidents."). 
240. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 171 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that work-
ers will generally receive unemployment insurance unless their dismissal was caused by willful misbe-
havior). 
241. See, e.g., Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 27-33. 
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proceeding operates as a means-test that mitigates the opossum problem. 
This does not mean that a bankruptcy proceeding must adopt an explicit 
means-test of the type advocated by the credit industry. There are two ap-
proaches to solving the opossum problem: (1) investigating each con-
sumer's ability to pay, and (2) punishing defaulting consumers and thus 
removing the incentive to play 'possum. The central question of this section 
is how a bankruptcy proceeding may facilitate such an investigation or such 
punishment. Subpart 1 will explore how bankruptcy facilitates the collection 
and use of information to measure a consumer's ability to pay. Subpart 2 
will examine how punishment can be used to determine whether the con-
sumer has the ability to pay and how bankruptcy facilitates or controls the 
application of this punishment. 
1. Bankruptcy and Information 
Recall that this section asks whether a formal bankruptcy procedure 
helps verify a consumer's need for relief. If a system of debt relief utilizes 
extensive information about the consumer's financial condition to determine 
if the consumer should repay her debts, there is a strong argument for gath-
ering this information only once in a groceeding that binds all creditors, 
thereby avoiding duplicative litigation. 42 The strength of this justification 
for offering greater relief in bankruptcy depends on the costs of gathering 
the information used in bankruptcy which in turn depends on the type of 
information used. The justification is quite compelling if society will under-
take the difficult and expensive task of forecasting the consumer's future 
earnings and expenses. The justification is less compelling if society adopts 
a system that, like Chapter 7 or taxation-based bankruptcy, considers only 
the consumer's actual income or assets. After all, non-bankruptcy law con-
siders these very same facts when setting a consumer's repayment obliga-
tion, though the bankruptcy procedure may facilitate a broader inquiry into 
the consumer's income or assets. The justification is even less compelling in 
a system that sets exemptions of income and assets so large that the vast 
majority of consumers repay nothing.243 If the exemptions are substantially 
in excess of a consumer's income at the time of borrowing, creditors are 
unlikely to seek a judicial procedure to verify that the consumer's income 
and assets remain exempt at the time of default. 
Note too that, as a positive matter, information has not played an impor-
tant role in determining the consumer's "ability to pay" in American bank-
ruptcy law. Although leading opinions suggest that the consumer's ability to 
pay plays a role in the "substantial abuse" analysis,244 some scholars com-
242. See, e.g., John C. Weistart, 11ze Costs of Bankruptcy, 41(4) L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1977); 
Jackson, supra note I, at 1395-96. 
243. This is clearly the case for rhe existing Chapter 7. See supra note 9. 
244. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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plain that this provision is effectively "dead-letter,"245 and, in any case, this 
potential means-test is a rather recent innovation. The "substantial abuse" 
provision was added in 1984,246 whereas the fundamental structure of Cha:E-
ter 7 dates back to the enactment of its predecessor, Chapter Vll, in 1898. 47 
Like Chapter 7, Chapter Vll required that the debtor repay with all of her 
non-exempt assets. But also like Chapter 7, Chapter Vll rarely resulted in 
any repayment for general creditors,24 in part because property exemptions 
have historically been fairly generous relative to the assets of ordinary 
Americans. 249 
Other forms of consumer bankruptcy employed in the United States 
may not have used a significantly greater amount of information to deter-
mine a debtor's ability to pay. Many forms of early bankruptcy, including 
Chapter 13' s predecessor, Chapter Xill, required creditor consent before 
granting a discharge.250 It is possible that creditors used this consent re-
quirement to insist that the consumer prove that she was repaying an 
amount commensurate with her ability to pay. Unfortunately, this claim is 
not plausible as scholars report that virtually all Chapter xm plans prom-
ised the identical repayment: the full repayment of all creditors.251 Similarly, 
numerous scholars question whether the disposable income test of Chapter 
13 truly adjusts the consumers' debts based on their ability to pay, arguing 
either that consumers are forced to simply promise the standard repayment 
rate of their jurisdiction252 or that consumers are able to evade this provision 
by simply threatening to convert their case to Chapter 7.253 
2. Bankruptcy and Punishment 
If the information needed to determine a consumer's ability to repay is 
sufficiently expensive, society may rationally refuse to collect any informa-
tion at all. In more colorful terms, "the game [isn't] worth the candle."254 
This does not mean that the system will ignore the opossum problem, only 
245. !d. 
246. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984). 
247. See Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 49. 
248. See. e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 63, at 87 n.27 (reporting that eighty-nine percent of 
straight, or Chapter Vll, bankruptcies in 1964 yielded nothing for creditors). 
249. Adjusted for inflation, the exemptions available to the consumer on the eve of the Bankruptcy 
Refonn Act of 1978 generally exceed those available today. See, e.g., Political Economy, supra note 12. 
250. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 87, at 11. 
251. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 63, at 94. 
252. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. 
BANKR. LJ. 501,532 (1993) ("The reality is that chapter 13 trustees and judges in the four cities [stud-
ied] effectively deter 0% plans and keep most plans above a floor percent that is known to local practi-
tioners."). This impression is shared by those who advise consumers on how to file for bankruptcy. See 
ROBIN LEONARD, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY: REPAY YOUR DEBTS 7/1 (5th ed. 2001) ("In some courts, 
the judge will not approve your plan unless you propose paying your unsecured creditors a significant 
portion of what you owe them, usually at least 70%.") The lawyers then respond by rarely or never 
submitting plans with less than the specified percentage. !d. 
253. See BAIRD, supra note 72, at 55. 
254. See Tabb, supra note 23, at 15-16. 
158 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:1:121 
that the system must find an alternative method of means-testing. When 
insurance programs cannot use information to restrict benefits to those who 
have suffered some misfortune, they generally employ punishment to sepa-
rate the opossums from the needy. Subpart a will provide a brief overview 
of how punishment can help solve the opossum problem. Subpart b will 
explore bankruptcy's role in administering this punishment. 
a. How Punishment Mitigates the Opossum Problem 
An insurer can mitigate the opossum problem by offering benefits unat-
tractive to those who do not need relief; insurers can adopt various forms of 
opossum repellent. Society can structure assistance so that it is more valu-
able to those intended to receive it. For example, subsidized health care is 
more valuable to the sick.255 Other forms of opossum repellent are less be-
nign. For example, the government may choose to provide extremely unde-
sirable public housing so that only those who truly need assistance would 
agree to live there. Some economists allege that a social assistance program 
that includes a work requirement (workfare) could be efficient even if this 
work yields no valuable output or training. 256 The work requirement effec-
tively transforms the assistance program into a very low paying job for the 
recipient, and those who can earn more and support themselves would do 
so, leaving only the truly needy to apply for support. 
Punishment can solve the opossum problem if it is more costly for those 
who overstate their need for relief than for those who have truly suffered. 
Yet it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to structure relief that repels 
the opossums without harming those who need relief. Those who choose 
inferior public housing because they are truly poor are forced into sub-
standard lodging, and recipients of workfare are forced to labor (and thus 
sacrifice leisure) even though their output produces little or no social value. 
Debt relief contains several forms of punishment or opossum repellent. 
The loan sharks or bookies in the movies257 never conduct extensive inquir-
ies as to their debtors' well-being. If they are not paid, they punish the 
debtor, perhaps by breaking her arm. This credible threat of punishment 
serves to distinguish those debtors who should repay their loans from those 
who should not. Those who have considerable disposable income will re-
duce their spending so they may repay the loan and avoid a broken arm, 
while those who cannot cut their spending will endure the punishment. 
255. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Economist's Lament: Public Assistance in America, 4 J. EcoN. 
PERSP. 57, 67 (1990). 
256. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes, 
62 REV. ECON. STUD. 187,201 (1995). 
257. See, e.g., ROCKY (Mgm!Ua Studios 1976) (prior to his shot at the title, Rocky Balboa was an 
enforcer for Philadelphia mobsters); The Sopranos: Happy Wanderer (HBO television broadcast, Feb. 
20, 2000); The Sopranos: Bust Out (HBO television broadcast, March 19, 2000); The Sopranos: Fun-
house (HBO television broadcast, Apr. 9, 2000) (demonstrating a situation where, in similar disregard 
for the debtor's well-being, a "friend's" gambling debt led Tony Soprano to commandeer his "friend's" 
sporting goods store and use it for a money laundering operation). 
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The punishment of debtor-creditor law need not take on such a grisly 
form. As long as it is non-pecuniary in nature, punishment has the potential 
of distinguishing those who can repay their debts from those who cannot. 
Punishment helps verify that a consumer cannot repay her debts because a 
truly destitute consumer will value each dollar that she has much more than 
she would if she were flush with cash. Parting with $1,000 is fairly easy if 
one has plenty of cash, but a consumer will endure great hardship to avoid 
repayment if the money is needed to feed her children. By contrast, a pecu-
niary penalty does not serve this role because both the well-off and the in-
solvent consumer would be willing to tolerate any pecuniary penalty up to 
$1 ,000 to avoid a $1,000 payment. 
Perhaps the main reason that consumers repay their obligations is that 
they fear the guilty conscience, the social stigma or the damage to their 
credit reputation that results from failing to repay their debts.Z58 The con-
sumer's guilt or shame can be thought of as a form of punishment because it 
harms the consumer but does not benefit the creditor or anyone else unless it 
induces the consumer to repay. Likewise, a creditor who reports a default to 
a credit bureau imposes a punishment on the consumer by making it harder 
for the consumer to borrow in the future. While this report may benefit fu-
ture lenders by helping them avoid making bad loans, it offers no direct 
benefit to the existing creditors. 
Previous scholars have suggested that punishment can be used to con-
trol other problems that plague credit markets. If creditors cannot distin-
guish high-risk debtors from low-risk debtors but the debtors know their 
own risk of default, this asymmetric information may cause creditors to 
ration credit for fear that only the high-risk debtors will apply for a loan.259 
Low-risk debtors can avoid this credit rationing if they can credibly distin-
guish themselves from their high-risk neighbors. The low-risk debtors can 
signal their quality by agreeing to collection terms that will make their life 
unpleasant after default. 260 These terms signal that the debtor is a good risk 
because low-risk debtors default less often and thus find the harsh terms less 
costly than their high-risk neighbors. Harsh collection terms can also miti-
gate the grasshopper problem, or the various forms of debtor misbehavior 
that make financial distress more likely.261 Stated simply, if financial dis-
tress will be more unpleasant, a debtor will take more care to avoid it. 
The arguments for using punishment to control the credit rationing and 
grasshopper problems are incomplete because one can also mitigate these 
2SS. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, S TEx. REV. L. & PoL. 393, 420-21 
(2001). 
259. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Lawrence Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informa-
tion, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 393,401 (1981). 
260. See Rea, supra note 92, at 196-99. 
261. For example, Professor Robert Scott suggests that punishment may be used to control various 
forms of debtor misbehavior such as shirking, overborrowing, and engaging in risky projects. See, e.g., 
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 
7 44-46 ( 1989). Each of these forms of misbehavior can be thought of as manifestations of the grasshop-
per problem because they make financial distress more likely. 
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problems by simply increasing the amount that a defaulting consumer must 
repay. To mitigate the credit rationing and grasshopper problems, one need 
only make default more painful. Rather than employ punishment, society 
can make default more painful and undesirable by requiring the consumer to 
make a larger repayment after default and thus endure a meager standard of 
living.262 More significantly, as long as other forms of market failure do not 
afflict credit markets, requiring a larger repayment will likely be preferable 
to punishment because the increased repayment yields a benefit to the credi-
tor (he is repaid at least in part) while punishment does not.263 
For example, Professor Robert Scott has argued in favor of laws that al-
low a creditor to seize the defaulting consumer's household goods, even 
though these goods have little or no value to the creditor, on the grounds 
that this punishment will cause the consumer to take more care to avoid 
financial distress.264 Assume that instead of seizing household goods the 
creditor seizes an item of equal importance to the consumer but with a 
greater resale value. Because each asset has the same importance to the con-
sumer, the threat of the loss of each asset will have the same impact on the 
consumer's incentive to take care. However, the proceeds from the asset 
with a significant resale value can be used to increase the lender's profits or 
to reduce the interest rate initially charged. Of course, the law may prevent 
the creditor from seizing more of the consumer's valuable assets or in-
come,265 but this does not necessarily serve as a justification for punish-
ment.266 Rather, one must explain why the law would force the consumer to 
rely on punishment rather than to pledge a greater repayment. 
Professor Scott suggests one reason why punishment may be more effi-
cient than measures that result in a direct benefit to the creditor. Professor 
Scott analogizes the taking of a security interest to the seizure of a hostage 
and claims that when a creditor holds a hostage with a high market value, 
the creditor has a significant incentive to misbehave by fabricating a default 
so that he may retain the hostage. 267 For example, the creditor may exag-
gerate the importance of a default and then, despite the procedural protec-
tions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,268 the creditor may sell 
the asset below the market price to a friend and proceed against the con-
262. Professors Aghion & Hermalin present an argument similar to that of Professor Rea that is based 
on the amount repaid rather than on punishment. See Phillipe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal 
Restrictions on Private Contract Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381,401 (1990). 
263. This argument has been made in the context of public assistance. See Bcscley & Coate, supra 
note 256, at 206 (arguing that if the government provides social assistance in order to provide a mini-
mum level of utility or happiness, it is always more efficient to screen those who can support themselves 
by offering smaller benefits than by imposing a punishment such as a work requirement, because the 
government may reduce expenditures by reducing benefits). 
264. See Scott, supra note 261, at 746-48. 
265. For example, the consumer may not waive her right to a bankruptcy discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 
524(a)(2} (2000). 
266. See Scott, supra note 261, at 747. 
267. See id. at 748. 
268. See U.C.C. §§ 9-6(Jl to -624 (2000). 
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sumer for the balance in a deficiency judgment.269 If the collateral has little 
or no resale value, however, the creditor will have no reason to misbehave 
in this manner. 270 
While Professor Scott provides a possible argument for preferring puni-
tive measures, this argument is implausible and inconsistent with observed 
market behavior. If it were more efficient to pledge low-value collateral 
than high-value collateral, then wealthy consumers would pledge household 
goods before pledging their car or their home. However, even when the law 
permitted the taking of security interests in household goods, consumers 
who owned a home were much more likely to obtain a loan from a bank 
than from the finance companies that specialized in taking security interests 
in household goods. 271 
The consumer and creditor may choose to use punishment to solve the 
credit-rationing and grasshopper problems if the contractual relationship is 
also plagued by the opossum problem. Moreover, there is one other possible 
justification for the use of punishment that can be adapted from the social 
assistance literature, but this argument has limited applicability beyond the 
very poor. Some justify work requirements in social assistance programs as 
a form of punishment designed to control the opossum and grasshopper 
problems discussed above.272 For example, a workfare requirement can 
make social assistance less attractive, providing citizens with an incentive to 
develop the skills necessary to support themselves, thus solving the grass-
hopper problem. A workfare requirement may also deter citizens from using 
social assistance when they have the skills to support themselves, thus solv-
ing the opossum problem. 273 If society adopts these programs to ensure that 
its citizens have some minimal level of welfare or happiness, however, it 
would never use workfare to provide the poor with an incentive to develop 
the skills necessary to support themselves because it could always provide 
citizens with the same incentive by just reducing social assistance bene-
fits.274 
Assume, however, that society wishes to guarantee its poorest citizens 
some minimal level of consumption but does not really care about the hap-
piness of these citizens. By assumption, society cannot reduce social assis-
tance benefits below the level of consumption it wishes to guarantee. By 
threatening to punish consumers who receive social assistance, however, 
269. See Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 117, 119-20 ( 1983), for an article questioning a secured creditor's incentive to sell an asset below 
its fair value. 
270. See Scott, supra note 261, at 749. 
271. See Gregory E. Boczar, Competition Between Banks and Finance Companies: A Cross Section 
Study of Personal Loan Debtors, 33 J. FIN. 245, 250 (1978). 
272. Besley & Coate, supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
273. Timothy Bes1ey & Stephen Coate, Workfare versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work 
Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1992) (discussing the "screen-
ing" (opossum problem) and "deterrent" (grasshopper problem) functions of punishment in the social 
assistance context). 
274. !d. at 253-56. 
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society will give the poor an incentive to develop the skills necessary to 
support themselves. Of course, not everyone will be able to do so, and some 
will suffer this punishment. By assumption, however, society is untroubled 
by the unhappiness caused by this punishment. 275 
Similarly, if debt relief laws are designed to ensure that the consumer 
has some minimal level of consumption so that her fellow citizens will not 
be forced to witness her poverty, one could argue for the use of punishment 
to solve the grasshopper problem because society does not care about the 
harm that this punishment inflicts. However, debtor-creditor law is not de-
signed to ensure that all consumers enjoy at least some minimum standard 
of living. Debtor-creditor law helps consumers retain the standard of living 
that they currently enjoy; as a consequence, some defaulting consumers are 
able to live quite comfortably while others remain impoverished.276 
b. How Does a Bankruptcy Procedure Help Punish 
the Consumer? 
It is well understood that punishment can discourage a consumer from 
defaulting when she should repay.277 However, how a procedure like bank-
ruptcy can and should facilitate this punishment is less explored. Because 
non-bankruptcy law may also inflict punishment on the consumer, we must 
answer the latter question if we are to understand bankruptcy's role in a 
larger system of debt relief. 
Consider the argument that only consumers who truly need relief will 
choose bankruptcy because a bankruptcy filing damages the consumer's 
ability to borrow again. A bankruptcy filing creates a long-term blemish on 
the consumer's credit reputation;278 federal law allows credit reporting 
agencies to report the filing for ten years.Z79 A bankruptcy filing damages a 
consumer's credit reputation because it indicates that the consumer who 
filed may be more likely to default again than the consumer with a clean 
credit history. But do credit markets need a bankruptcy system to record the 
consumer's failure to pay? 
Historically, the public nature of a bankruptcy filing may have signifi-
cantly enhanced the ability of creditors to learn of a consumer's default and 
thus adjust their assessment of the risk of lending to that consumer. Con-
tracts are generally private, and unless a creditor pursued some remedy in 
the courts, other creditors may have had little opportunity to learn of a con-
sumer's default. Today, however, many creditors subscribe to credit report-
ing services. These services provide the creditor with a great deal of infor-
275. !d. at 256-58. 
276. See Non-Procrusrean Bankruprcy, supra note 42. 
277. Rea, supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
278. David Musto, What Happens When lnjonTUJtion Leaves a Market? Evidence from Post-
Bankruptcy Consumers, 77 J. Bus. (forthcoming), at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-musto/papers/c7 
.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
279. IS U.S.C. § 168lc (2000). 
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mation about the consumer's financial affairs including the consumer's his-
tory of payments to each of the subscribing creditors. Therefore, the primary 
consumer lenders will know of each time that the consumer was delinquent 
on her prior debts. If the passage of time makes it clear that the consumer 
will not repay her obligation, the creditor will charge off the loan as uncol-
lectible, and the credit report will record this fact as well. These charge-offs, 
like any other non-bankruptcy information, will be wiped clean in seven 
years time, 280 but the law could allow a non-bankruptcy default to be re-
ported for just as long as a bankruptcy filing. In short, it is not clear that 
credit markets need a system like bankruptcy to identify those consumers 
who fail to repay their debts. 
Next, consider the social stigma attached to bankruptcy. At one time, 
bankruptcy was clearly designed to shame the defaulting debtor. For exam-
ple, in the Middle Ages, bankrupt merchants were made to perform "repul-
sive ceremonies" that "savoured of nursery wit."281 Today, American bank-
ruptcy law no longer goes to such great lengths to publicly humiliate the 
debtor. In fact, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 made several changes to lessen 
the shame experienced by the consumer, includin~ the replacement of the 
label "bankrupt" with the less offensive "debtor." 82 Some have lamented 
this loss of shaming,283 even attributing the rise in bankruptcy filings to the 
1 f . 284 oss o st1gma. 
Of more relevance to this Article is whether creditors need a system like 
bankruptcy to shame the consumer when the historical record clearly dem-
onstrates that they do not. As discussed above, creditors have gone to great 
lengths to shame defaulting debtors who did not make use of the bankruptcy 
process by sitting or fasting on the debtor's doorsteps or employing scantily 
clad women and costumed characters to humiliate the debtor.Z85 In fact, 
creditors will have an incentive to impose too much punishment on a de-
faulting consumer because the consumer will almost always have the capac-
ity to pay one dollar more and she can be forced to do so if threatened with 
a sufficiently severe penalty. We generally think that it is bankruptcy's role 
to reduce this harassment or punishment, though, as demonstrated by Part 
II, non-bankruptcy law may regulate this harassment as well. 286 
280. /d. Note that unsatisfied civil judgments may be reported for longer than seven years if the 
statute oflimitations is longer than seven years. /d. 
281. Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. 
REV. 373, 387 (1937). 
282. Gross, supra note 234, at 110 (arguing that this change was made in an effort to reduce the 
stigma of bankruptcy). 
283. G. Marcus Cole, A Modest Proposal for Bankruptcy Refonn, in 5 GREEN BAG 269 (2d ed. 2002) 
(arguing for a mild form of debtor's prison as a form of shaming to discourage debtors from overspend-
ing). 
284. David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and 
Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. 319 (2002) (arguing that much of the rise in bankruptcy filings must have 
been caused by a decline in the stigma of filing because it cannot be explained by economic factors). 
285. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text. 
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There are two forms of punishment in bankruptcy that non-bankruptcy 
law cannot easily replicate: (1) forcing the consumer to default on all of her 
loans, including those owed to a creditor whom she would prefer to repay; 
and (2) limiting the frequency with which the consumer may claim debt 
relief. In practice, the first punishment plays a small role in our bankruptcy 
law. However, the second punishment has been a fixture of American bank-
ruptcy law almost since its inception. 
A bankrupt debtor may default on most of her loans287 but remain obli-
gated to preferred creditors if she can reaffirm these favored loans. Most of 
the debate over the role of reaffirmation agreements in bankruptcy centers 
on whether these agreements are in the consumer's best interest at the time 
of filing. Some argue that parties only enter into agreements if they are mu-
tually beneficial; therefore, reaffirmation agreements must improve the lot 
of consumers at the time of bankruptcy.288 Critics of reaffirmation agree-
ments argue for greater judicial supervision of these agreements on the 
grounds that consumers (even those represented by attorneys) frequently 
make poor decisions regarding reaffirmations.289 
More interesting are the claims that reaffirmation agreements should be 
banned even if they improve the lot of the consumer at the time of filing. 
Adler and his co-authors provide one such argument, but their argument is 
incomplete. Stated simply, they claim that reaffirmation agreements may 
lessen the pain of default for the consumer and thus may lead her to take 
less care to avoid financial distress.290 A ban on reaffirmation agreements 
would reduce consumer welfare after default but would produce no direct 
benefit to any other party, effectively serving as a punishment. As explained 
above, arguments for the use of punishment to cause consumers to take 
more care to avoid financial distress are incomplete. Society can more effi-
ciently induce consumers to take care by forcing the consumer to repay 
more after default.291 
One can make a more powerful argument against reaffirmation agree-
ments by focusing on the opossum problem. Elizabeth Warren has argued 
that wealthy consumers use reaffirmation agreements to "work the system" 
and provides as an example a wealthy bankrupt who reaffirms a lease on her 
Mercedes.292 If we believe that bankrupt consumers should be allowed to 
shield all of their future income from the claims of their pre-petition credi-
tors, it should not bother us that a consumer chooses to spend some of this 
income on the luxury car that she currently drives. If we assume instead that 
287. Bankruptcy exempts some loans from the discharge for public policy reasons. 11 U.S.C. § 523 
(2000) (providing that Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code does not discharge, among other things, debts 
arising from willful and malicious injury). 
288. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 59, at 601-02. 
289. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of 
Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 764-65 (1999). 
290. Adler et al., supra note 259, at 601-03. 
29 L See supra notes 259-275 and accompanying text. 
292. Warren, supra note 113, at 500. 
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the law does a poor job of limiting the relief to that which the consumer 
deserves, then a ban on reaffirmations may help screen those consumers 
who should pay more by serving as a form of punishment. That is, a con-
sumer may be loathe to default if doing so means that she must default on 
all of her loans simultaneously. 
Despite some early discussion by the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission,293 there seems little chance that reaffirmation agreements will 
be banned. A far more important form of punishment used by bankruptcy is 
the limitation of the consumer's further access to debt relief. The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1898 marked the first time that a consumer could re-
ceive a discharge without obtaining the consent of her creditors, and Con-
gress quickly followed this innovation with another reform that forced the 
consumer to wait a period of years before obtaining a second discharge. 294 
Today, a consumer cannot receive a discharge in Chapter 7 if she has re-
ceived another Chapter 7 discharge within the last six years or another dis-
charge pursuant to a repayment plan in which she repaid less than seventy 
percent of her debts.Z95 The pending bankruptcy legislation would extend 
this waiting period to eight years and remove the exception for filings in 
which the consumer repaid at least seventy percent of her debts.296 Today 
the consumer who has received a discharge remains free to receive another 
in Chapter 13, but the pending legislation would make her wait at least four 
years after filing in Chapter 7 and up to two years after receiving a dis-
charge in another Chapter 13.297 Though some have questioned the wisdom 
of extending the limitation on serial discharges to Chapter 13,298 the litera-
ture is virtually silent on the limitation imposed in Chapter 7. 
There are two conflicting ways in which the ban on repeat filings may 
affect the consumer's incentive to initially file for bankruptcy. First, the ban 
on repeat filings may deter a consumer from filing for bankruptcy if she 
fears that by doing so she will lose her right to file for Chapter 7 again and 
thus jeopardize her ability to withstand future misfortune. This effect oper-
ates in a manner similar to that of punishment because the consumer loses 
something, the right to further relief in Chapter 7, and her current creditors 
receive no corresponding direct benefit. If this ban on subsequent discharges 
is intended as a form of punishment, however, one may well question its 
advisability. Ideally, society would create punishments that harm the con-
sumer who has truly suffered misfortune much less than the consumer who 
retains the ability to repay her debts, as this would minimize the social costs 
of the punishment. However, the consumer who has truly suffered misfor-
tune, say a hospitalization or an extended period of unemployment, may be 
293. See id. at 498-502. 
294. Tabb, supra note 189, at 365-67. 
295. II U.S.C. § 727 (2000). 
296. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003. H.R. 975, I 08th Con g. § 
312( I )(2003 ). 
297. See id. at§ 312(2)(f)(l)-(2). 
298. See, e.g .• DeJamatt, supra note I 13. 
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even more likely than their more fortunate peers to suffer further misfortune 
and thus need further debt relief. 
Note, however, that the ban on subsequent discharges may actually 
work to encourage the consumer to file for bankruptcy. To understand this 
argument, assume that there is no limit on the number of times that a con-
sumer can file under Chapter 7, that few consumers have any assets that 
could be seized in bankruptcy,299 and that courts do not use the substantial 
abuse provision of the Bankruptcy Code to deny the discharge to those con-
sumers with an ability to repay their debts out of their future income.300 If 
this were true, the only check on the consumer's decision to file would be 
her credit reputation. In this world, a bankruptcy filing could have devastat-
ing effects on a consumer's ability to obtain credit in the future because 
creditors would be worried that the consumer would file again. Some con-
sumers might suffer extreme hardship to avoid suffering this fate. If the 
consumer's ability to obtain future debt relief were limited, however, the 
consequences of default may be less severe. That is, creditors may be more 
willing to extend credit to those who have previously defaulted on their 
loans because they know that these consumers will find it more painful to 
default again in the future. By limiting the ability of the honest, but unfortu-
nate, consumer to obtain further debt relief, the law may help such a con-
sumer obtain the credit needed to start her life again and thus may facilitate 
the fresh start. 
Of course the consumer will remain subject to future risks and thus may 
need further debt relief, even if this relief is somehow less generous. Society 
could, for example, offer two forms of bankruptcy relief and make the more 
generous form available only once. Alternatively, society could make bank-
ruptcy available only once and force those who experience further misfor-
tune to find refuge under non-bankruptcy law. This topic is discussed in the 
next section. 
IV. WHY HAVE PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF DEBT RELIEF? 
Part III argues that society may decide to adopt a bankruptcy system 
that offers more generous relief than available under non-bankruptcy law if 
it believes that a bankruptcy procedure helps verify that the defaulting con-
sumer lacks the ability to repay her debts. If true, why does society provide 
debt relief to consumers who do not file for bankruptcy? Specifically, soci-
ety could adopt non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor laws that (1) presume that 
those consumers who do not file for bankruptcy should repay their debts in 
full, and (2) employ severe collections measures designed to force debtors 
to repay in full, if at all possible. However, modem non-bankruptcy law 
clearly does not do this. The days of debtor's prison and capital punishment 
299. As discussed above, there is ample support for this assumption. See supra notes 9-10 and 
accompanying text. 
300. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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for the non-payment of debts301 have long since passed. Today, non-
bankruptcy law limits the amount of income and assets that a creditor can 
attach302 and the manner in which a creditor can contact a defaulting con-
sumer or report the default to third parties?03 These laws make some con-
sumers "judgment proof' by makin~ it either impossible, or just too costly, 
to enforce a judgment against them. 04 
Given that society also offers a bankruptcy discharge, why does it sig-
nificantly limit non-bankruptcy collections? Two explanations immediately 
present themselves, yet neither is complete. First, non-bankruptcy law may 
be designed to delay, rather than deny collections?05 This explanation is 
consistent with much of the structure of non-bankruptcy law, but is mark-
edly inconsistent with the fact that most of the loans that banks charge off as 
non-collectible are not owed by bankrupt debtors.306 Second, non-
bankruptcy law may offer the consumer some relief to mitigate the effect of 
the limitation on the number of times that a consumer can receive a dis-
charge in Chapter 7 ?07 This argument is incomplete because consumers 
denied access to Chapter 7 can still receive relief in Chapter 13.308 
Perhaps a stronger justification for the debt relief offered in non-
bankruptcy law is that the non-bankruptcy collections process may serve as 
a cheaper, albeit less perfect, method of verifying a consumer's inability to 
pay and thus should grant the consumer less generous debt relief?09 This 
explanation for the role of non-bankruptcy law has important implications 
for the current debate over bankruptcy reform. For decades, the consumer 
credit industry has lobbied for some form of information-based means-test 
that would prevent consumers from receiving the immediate discharge of 
Chapter 7 if their income is sufficiently greater than their living expenses.310 
Our nation's bankruptcy law professors have generally opposed this explicit 
means-testing,311 and today this opposition is overwhelming within the 
academy. 312 
Many of the arguments raised by the opponents of explicit means-
testing address the specific details of the tests proposed, and this Article will 
30 I. Ancient Athens considered defaulting on a debt to be a capital crime. See, e.g., Lawrence H. 
White, Bankruptcy as an Economic Intervention, I J. LmERTARlAN STUD. 281, 281 (1977). In ancient 
Rome the creditors of a defaulting debtor could enslave the debtor or "divide the debtor's body into 
proportionate shares." /d. 
302. See supra Part II.B.3. 
303. See supra Part II. B.!. 
304. See Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991) 
(discussing judgment-proof debtors). 
305. See infra Part IV.A. 
306. See supra note 4. 
307. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text. 
308. II U.S.C. § 1328 (2000). 
309. See infra Part IV.C. 
310. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to 
Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 820-27 (1983). 
311. See id. at 827 (comparing means-testing to indentured servitude or "mass peonage"). 
312. See supra note 23. 
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not add to the large volume of literature debating the finer points of the 
various bankruptcy bills. 313 This Article focuses on a more fundamental 
argument made against an explicit means-test: that means-testing would -
greatly increase the cost of filing for bankruptcy and thereby make bank-
ruptcy relief unavailable to many Americans?14 Although this argument is 
presented within the specific context of the reforms pushed by the consumer 
credit industry, it reflects a more fundamental question about the proper role 
of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law. Any inquiry into the consumer's 
financial condition will lengthen a proceeding and make it more expensive. 
Society must choose the correct balance between accuracy and cost. This 
balance may be difficult to reach because it is unlikely that a single system 
would fit all consumers. Proceedings designed to collect enough facts to 
identify high-income consumers who have an ability to repay some of their 
debts without undue hardship may be so costly as to price the poor out of 
bankruptcy altogether. However, this effect on the poor need not cause us to 
abandon information-based means-testing, at least in the abstract, as long as 
lower-income consumers can be given adequate relief under non-
bankruptcy law. 
A. Non-Bankruptcy Debt Relief as Temporary Relief 
Even if the law presumed that consumers who do not file for bankruptcy 
should repay their debts in full, it need not presume that they should repay 
their debts immediately. For example, a consumer may be able to pay a 
judgment entered against her out of her future earnings, but she may lack 
the funds necessary to pay the judgment now. Of course, if credit markets 
313. For example, critics argue that the proposed reforms would make bankruptcy too meager, either 
by requiring consumers to repay over too many years or by providing for living expenses that are unrea-
sonably low. See Letter of Sept. 7, 1999, supra note 21. Note that this view is somewhat contradicted by 
emerging economics literature that suggests that consumer welfare would increase if the generosity of 
debt relief were restricted. See supra note 135. Critics also allege that that the reforms would impose an 
excessively rigid test of a consumer's ability to pay and that bankruptcy is better served by the more 
discretionary standard of existing law. See Letter of Sept. 7, 1999, supra note 21. This is another mani-
festation of the rules versus discretion debate. Another argument raised in the letters to Congress is that 
all consumers must retain easy access to a bankruptcy discharge to further the ability of family law 
creditors to pursue deadbeat dads. ld. Fundamentally, the argument is that the bankruptcy discharge 
strengthens the hand of family law creditors because general obligations are dischargeable while family 
law claims are not. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000). Of course, one might well question why the law cannot 
strengthen the hand of family law debtors by reforming non-bankruptcy law or making other changes 
that are more specific to deadbeat dads. For example, in recent years the federal government has passed a 
significant amount of legislation designed to increase the ability of family law creditors to collect, in-
cluding imposing a requirement that states garnish the wages of all non-custodial parents even if these 
parents have never missed a payment. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 101(b), 
102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (requiring that states implement immediate wage withholding for all child support 
orders issued or modified after January I, 1994, unless both parents or the court arrange a different plan). 
A full discussion of family law obligations is beyond the scope of this Article, however, because of the 
unique issues that these obligations present. 
314. See, e.g., Letter of Sept. 7, 1999, supra note 21 ('The trick is identifying the real abusers at an 
acceptable cost, without unfairly burdening those 'honest but unfortunate' debtors who legitimately need 
chapter 7 bankruptcy relief."). But see Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19 (arguing that the administrative 
costs imposed by the bankruptcy reforms would not unduly burden lower-income bankrupt consumers). 
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functioned perfectly, the consumer could borrow against her future income 
to pay this judgment. However, the consumer may be unable to do so, per-
haps in part because bankruptcy and other debt relief laws prevent her from 
effectively promising to repay this loan in full. Recognizing that the con-
sumer may need to pay her judgment over time, the law may sensibly re-
strict the rate at which the consumer must repay. 
This theory fits well with the putative structure of a non-bankruptcy col-
lections system that protects some portion of the consumer's income and 
assets from attachment but usually allows a diligent creditor to retain her 
judgment indefinitely.315 This theory fits less well with the empirical evi-
dence that suggests that a substantial portion of the debts that creditors must 
write off as uncollectible are not discharged in bankruptcy?16 Nor does this 
theory fit with the fact that non-bankruptcy laws effectively render some 
consumers 'judgment-proof' by exempting all of their income and assets 
from their general creditors. 317 
B. Limited Relief and the Serial Discharge 
As explained above, the limit on the number of times that a consumer 
can obtain a bankruptcy discharge in a given period may play an important 
role in ensuring that consumers use bankruptcy only when they are in need 
of debt relief.318 Unfortunately, consumers who have filed for bankruptcy 
remain subject to the same risks that caused their initial financial distress. 
Society may wish to offer some non-bankruptcy debt relief to those con-
sumers who are unable to obtain a discharge in Chapter 7 because oi:" their 
previous filing. This explanation for the relief offered by non-bankruptcy 
collections law is incomplete because society can, and does, offer bank-
ruptcy relief to consumers who have recently received a discharge. Al-
though these consumers are barred from Chapter 7, they are free to file 
again in Chapter 13.319 
315. See Crandall, supra note 149, at 6-227. 
316. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
317. See Kovac. supra note 304, at 677 (discussing judgment-proof debtors). 
318. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text. 
319. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2000). It is noteworthy that the ability of a debtor to receive subsequent 
bankruptcy protection is tied to the choice of bankruptcy relief. That is, a consumer who receives a 
discharge in Chapter 1 cannot receive another discharge in Chapter 1 for six years. 11 U.S.C. § 523 
(2000). On the other hand, a consumer who receives a discharge in Chapter 13 can immediately file for 
relief under Chapter 1 as long as she has repaid at least seventy percent of her unsecured claims and 
made her "best effort." See id. This divergence fits well with the theory of punishment. There is little 
point in punishing a debtor if one actually verifies that the debtor cannot repay her debts, and perhaps the 
"best effort" standard ensures that the consumer is truly destitute. However, one should not place too 
much emphasis on this divergence as Chapter 13 plans appear to have a fairly high failure rate. See supra 
note 32. 
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C. Non-Bankruptcy Law as a Cheaper Form of Debt Relief 
A generation ago the typical bankrupt was described as a member of the 
lower or working class, 320 and scholars reacted to this fact in one of two 
ways. Some prominent bankruptcy scholars argued for the reform of non-
bankruptcy collection laws, such as wage garnishment, in the hopes that the 
poor would find debt relief without burdening the bankruptcy courts.321 
Others argued that bankruptcy law should be greatly simplified to lessen the 
burden that courts face when processing consumer bankruptcies; some 
scholars even argued that bankruptcy should be largely controlled by an 
administrative agency.322 Today the calls for the reform of our non-
bankruptcy collections laws seem to have fallen by the wayside?3 and our 
nation's law professors generally argue that bankruptcy must remain a fairly 
simple process so that the poor may find adequate relieC24 
Today the popular conception of the bankrupt consumer is changing. 
Newspaper reports of celebrity bankrupts provide anecdotal evidence that 
some of the wealthy (or at least formerly wealthy) make use of bankruptcy 
protection.325 More importantly, recent studies of American bankrupts re-
veal that most are drawn from the middle class326 and that they represent a 
cross-section of the general population.327 Just as the financial resources of 
Americans differ markedly, however, so do the resources of bankrupt 
320. See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 63, at 42 ('The typical debtor interviewed in these 
districts was an industrial worker, earning a little over $100 a week."). 
321. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 721 (1967) (Vern Country-
man arguing for limitations on garnishment to "relieve the Federal bankruptcy system of the burden of 
cases where bankruptcy petitions are filed only to avoid garnishment."). 
322. See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 63, at 4 ("All bankruptcy cases except reorganizations 
of corporations would be handled by a newly established administrative agency."). 
323. But see Kovac, supra note 304, at 763 (arguing that garnishment laws should be made more 
generous to relieve bankruptcy courts of the large number of filings). 
324. See supra note 24. 
325. See, e.g., Philip Shenon. Home Exemptions Snag Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at 
AI ("[S]everal other celebrities ... in Florida and Texas [declared bankruptcy] in recent years and held 
onto large homes. The actor Burt Reynolds kept his $2.5 million Florida home, Valhalla, after declaring 
bankruptcy in 1996 ... Bowie Kuhn, the former baseball commissioner, bought a $! million five-
bedroom, five-bath home ... Former Gov. John B. Connally of Texas declared bankruptcy in 1987 with 
$49 million in debts .... "). 
326. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27. Some define middle class based on 
income. See, e.g., Christine Dugas, Middle Class Barely Treads Water, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2003, at 
http:/fwww.usatoday.com/money/perftlgeneral/2003-09-14-middle-covcr_x.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 
2004) (Stating that "middle class families" are "often broadly defined as those earning $25,000 to 
$99,999"). However, Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook look to a range of indicators beyond income or 
wealth. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 28-33. In fact, it is quite difficult to 
define the term "middle class," and, according to the authors, 'The most important point to make about 
the American middle class is that most Americans believe that they are in it." /d. at 28. Indeed, Sullivan, 
Warren & Westbrook define "middle class" in a way that includes themselves. See id. at I ("Stolid 
middle-class people, such as ourselves .... "). 
327. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Becoming Prosperiry 's Panner Largely Declaration of the Middle Class, 
CHI. TRIB., July 5, 1998, at 6 (quoting Elizabeth Warren, "[bankrupt debtors] are middle-class-that's 
what's scary about this .... They are not marginal workers. They are you and me, they are our 
neighbors."). 
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Americans.328 There is little reason to believe that the same system of debt 
relief is appropriate for every American. 329 
Fortunately, the law does not provide the same Procrustean insurance to 
every consumer.330 Just as wealthier individuals typically purchase insur-
ance policies that guarantee a higher standard of living for themselves, each 
of the various forms of debt relief tends to allow wealthier individuals to 
maintain a higher standard of living after default than their less fortunate 
peers.331 Yet the law must also create a system that recognizes the differ-
ences between consumers in the procedure that it applies, as well as in the 
generosity of relief that it affords. Perhaps the law could tailor the procedure 
employed within a single system of debt relief to the consumer's particular 
circumstances. Depending on some empirical assumptions, however, the 
parallel systems of debt relief may allow the law to accomplish this task 
more cheaply. 
1. Would All Consumers Bargain for the Same Procedure 
for Dispensing Debt Relief? 
There seems to be a general consensus in this country that our bank-
ruptcy system should not force the very poor to repay their debts. Though 
sometimes referred to as "mean-spirited,"332 each of the iterations of bank-
ruptcy reform legislation offered by the credit industry over the past few 
years has purported to exempt those with an income below a designated 
threshold from the new means-testing provisions.333 The latest iteration ex-
empts all those who earn less than the median income of similarly sized 
households in the state in which they live.334 Perhaps such exemptions are 
designed merely to appeal to populist sentiment, but it is worth asking 
whether there is a more rational reason to support these exemptions. 
One cannot simply claim that, by definition, lower-income consumers 
lack the income necessary to repay their debts. In 2001, the median income 
for a household of four ranged from a low of $46,596 in New Mexico to a 
high of $82,879 in Maryland.335 Obviously, many Americans who earned 
328. As one would expect, bankrupt Americans tend to have significantly less income and wealth 
than solvent Americans. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 59-69 (describing 
the income and assets of bankrupt Americans). However, it is clear that at least a few bankrupt debtors 
have, or at least once had, substantial incomes. See supra note 325. Other bankrupt debtors never en-
joyed such a lavish lifestyle. See Kovac, supra note 304, at 677. 
329. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text. 
330. See infra Part N.C. 
331. See Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, supra note 42. 
332. 147 CONG. REC. S7721, 7725 (daily ed. July 17, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone criticizing 
the bankruptcy reform legislation as a "harsh, mean-spirited piece oflegislation"). 
333. See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19. at 183-207. 
334. H.R. REP. No. 108-975, § 102(h)(2). 
335. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN INCOME FOR 4-PERSON FAMILIES, BY STATE, at 
http:f/www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). Median income for all 
families is a little lower and ranges from $30,982 in West Virginia to $58,759 in New Jersey. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME (IN 2003 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) 
HOUSEHOLDS (STATE LEVEL), at hltp://www.census.gov/acs/www!Products/Ranking/2002/R07T040.ht 
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less than the median income of their state did not recently experience one of 
the misfortunes that bankruptcy is defined to insure against, and thus there 
is no reason to presume that they could not repay their debts. As a result, the 
vast majority of lower-income Americans repay their debts in full-that is 
why so many Americans with below median income are able to obtain 
credit.336 
One could argue that consumers with an income that falls below some 
threshold should not repay their debts because doing so would lower their 
consumption below the minimal level that society tries to guarantee for all 
of its citizens and, thus, this repayment imposes costs on society generally. 
Society does provide social assistance to the poor, and these programs are 
often justified on the theory that wealthy citizens care about the standard of 
living of the poor.337 Moreover, these social insurance programs may induce 
the consumer to borrow too much, and society may have an incentive to 
discourage borrowing either by exempting some of the debtor's income 
from attachment or by imposing restrictions on the rate of interest that 
creditors may charge?38 Yet this argument is not fully in accord with the 
view that bankruptcy should not means-test Americans with incomes below 
the applicable median because our system of social welfare is just not that 
generous. The argument may explain why limitations on garnishment fully 
exempt an amount of take-home pay equal to thirty times the federal mini-
mum wage,339 because individuals who earn only this amount may well be 
tempted to leave their jobs and apply for social assistance. Yet few could 
argue with a straight face that if a resident of Maryland (as the sole money-
maker of a family of four) earning close to $83,000 per year is asked tore-
pay anything to her creditors she will quit work and decide to live off of 
unemployment insurance. Even if she qualified for Maryland unemploy-
ment insurance, it would pay her no more than $280 per week.340 
A better justification for refusing to means-test those who earn less than 
the median income is that it is not cost effective to investigate their ability 
to pay. This argument can be more clearly explained using the optimal con-
tracts literature in which a debtor wishes to borrow from a creditor and the 
parties are free to negotiate whatever contractual terms they wish. The cen-
m (last visited Sept. 27. 2004). 
336. For example, almost twenty-five percent of Americans with income below the twentieth percen~ 
tile had some credit card debt and this amount rose to more than fifty percent for Americans with income 
between the fortieth and sixtieth percentile. See Ana M. Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell, & Kevin B. 
Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 2003, at 22, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubslbullet 
inl2003/03bulletin.htm#jan. 
337. See, e.g .. Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 542,543 (1969). 
338. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 
307-09 (1995); Jackson, supra note I, at 1402. 
339. E.g., !5 U.S.C. § 1673 (2002). 
340. See ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, ISSUE GUIDE ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, at http:/lww 
w.epinet.orglcontent.cfrnlissueguides_unemployment_index (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). 
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tral problem in this literature is that the debtor's future wealth is uncertain 
and the creditor cannot costlessly observe the debtor's actual wealth at the 
time of repayment, and thus cannot costlessly verify the debtor's need for 
relief. The central problem in these models is the opossum problem. 
In some models the creditor is able to verify the debtor's wealth (and 
hence her ability to repay) by expending some fixed cost, for example by 
auditing the debtor's accounts.341 In other models the creditor verifies a 
debtor's inability to pay by imposing a punishment roughly equal to the 
shortfall in repayment.342 Regardless, the contract they choose is roughly the 
same. Following some technical assumptions,343 one finds that the optimal 
contract is a simple debt contract that demands the payment of some fixed 
amount (the face value of the debt) whenever the debtor's wealth is above 
some level. By requiring that the debtor repay the same amount whenever 
the debtor is sufficiently well-off, the contract avoids the need for an inquiry 
or punishment in most cases. 
When the debtor's income falls below this fixed amount, the contract al-
lows the debtor to pay less than the face value of the debt and calls on the 
creditor (or a court) to verify the debtor's inability to repay in full. The 
creditor can verify the debtor's claim of distress by investigating her finan-
cial condition. If the debtor correctly reports her financial condition, she is 
allowed to keep some fixed amount for her own consumption and is asked 
to repay with anything in excess of this amount.344 Alternately, the creditor 
can verify by imposing a penalty equal to the shortfall in repayment.345 
In a recent article, Professor Kelly Welch adds to this analysis by allow-
ing the parties to include both verification and punishment in their con-
tract. 346 Critically, the cost of gathering information is assumed to be fixed. 
By contrast, the cost of punishment declines as the debtor's wealth moves 
closer to the full repayment point because the short-fall in repayments is 
smaller and the creditor need only impose a punishment sufficient to ensure 
that the debtor cannot repay in full. Thus the optimal contract may contain 
three regions. If the debtor's wealth is above some point, the debtor repays 
in full. If it is a little below this amount, the debtor makes a partial repay-
ment and the creditor imposes a punishment equal to the shortfall. If the 
debtor's wealth falls below an even lower threshold, the creditor no longer 
punishes the debtor but instead conducts an inquiry to verify that the debtor 
has indeed suffered some misfortune.347 
341. See, e.g., Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State 
Verification, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (t979). 
342. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegation Monitoring, 51 REv. 
ECON. STUD. 393 (1984). 
343. The literature generally assumes that the lender and borrower cannot contract for randomly 
imposed investigations. See, e.g., Douglas Gale & Manin Hellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt Con· 
tracts: The One-Period Problem, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 647 (1985). 
344. See id. at 654-55. 
345. See Diamond, supra note 342. 
346. See, e.g., Welch, supra note 22. 
347. See id. 
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This "tipping point" between punishment and information depends on 
the cost of conducting an inquiry. If it is very costly to investigate, the con-
tract may rely almost exclusively on punishment to verify a debtor's claim 
for debt relief. Note too that the cost of the inquiry is relative to the size of 
the loan and the scale of a debtor's resources. Therefore, if the cost of con-
ducting an inquiry into the debtor's finances is sufficiently large, it may 
never be cost effective to conduct such an inquiry of some debtors, namely 
the poor. 
This literature provides some interesting intuition about the role of 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law in debt collection. For example, Profes-
sor Welch argues that the bankruptcy system uses information to verifl that 
a debtor cannot repay while non-bankruptcy law uses punishment.34 The 
debtor may indeed experience more punishment under non-bankruptcy law; 
the automatic stay in bankruptcy may put a stop to the harassing telephone 
calls and letters that the debtor receives,349 but it is not at all clear that the 
most common form of bankruptcy, Chapter 7, uses a greater amount of in-
formation to verify a debtor's inability to pay. To the extent that the "sub-
stantial abuse" provision is truly a "dead letter,"350 non-bankruptcy law 
seems to conduct a greater inquiry into a debtor's ability to pay because it 
considers the debtor's income when determining how much the creditor can 
garnish.351 As discussed below, however, this theory may help justify the 
structure of the bankruptcy reform proposals. 
2. Steering Consumers into the Procedure Most Appropriate for Them 
The basic claim of the previous section is that different consumers 
would choose different procedures for determining how much they should 
repay after default because it is more cost effective to investigate a wealthy 
individual's ability to repay. This lesson is in accord with our intuition. It is 
obviously more reasonable to conduct a thorough inquiry into the earnings 
and expenses of a consumer with a six-figure income than someone living 
near the poverty line. 
For decades the consumer credit industry has advocated the adoption of 
an explicit "means-test" in bankruptcy.352 Fundamentally, such a test would 
try to assess a consumer's ability to repay her debts based on an investiga-
tion of the consumer's financial condition, and this investigation would en-
tail costs that are appropriate for some but not for others. For example, if, at 
the time of borrowing, a consumer could specify the procedure for resolving 
348. See id. 
349. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
350. See Zywicki, supra note 223, at 423 ("Similarly, lawyer and former law professor George Wal-
lace has observed, 'There are over 300 bankruptcy judges out there, and, in most of their courts,§ 707(b) 
is simply a dead letter."'). 
351. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1673 (2002) (exempting the greater of thirty times the federal minimum 
wage or seventy-five percent of the debtor's take-home pay). 
352. See Countryman, supra note 310, at 820-27 (chronicling this struggle). 
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a default, it is possible that a highly paid professional borrowing a substan-
tial amount would agree to a costly investigation into her finances. If, how-
ever, the consumer earns an amount barely in excess of minimum wage, she 
would never agree to such an expensive investigation; she would rely on 
less costly forms of verification in the event of default. 
Of course, society could implement a bankruptcy system that applies 
different levels of inquiry to different consumers. One may believe that trus-
tees currently use the "substantial abuse" provision353 to scrutinize those 
few consumers with significant incomes while ignoring all others. Yet such 
an approach can only mitigate, not eliminate, the trade-off between accu-
racy and cost because a system must find some way of determining which 
consumers to subject to further investigation. 
Many bankruptcy scholars have criticized the proposed reforms for fail-
ing to exempt those consumers with an income below the applicable median 
from the added procedural requirements?54 While these scholars may be 
correct in criticizing the proposed reforms, their criticism presumes that 
courts can easily determine the consumer's income, a presumption that is 
sharply contradicted by the available evidence on the accuracy of bank-
ruptcy filings. One study conducted by a bankruptcy judge suggests that 
ninety-nine percent of bankruptcy filings contain at least one serious inter-
nal inconsistency.355 Furthermore, forty-three percent of filings show a 
marked imbalance between stated income and expenses that implies either 
that the consumer has misstated one or the other, or that the consumer will 
return to financial distress shortly after filing for bankruptcy.356 Society 
could improve the accuracy of the reported income by forcing the consumer 
to produce further documentation to support her claim (such as tax returns 
from previous years), but such documentation may be costly for the con-
sumer to collect. In fact, the pending bankruptcy legislation's requirement 
that the consumer file tax returns is one of the more criticized portions of 
the legislation.357 
Society could try to shift the costs of conducting the investigation to the 
creditors by, for example, requiring little initial information from the con-
353. II U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). 
354. See, e.g., Braucher & Mooney, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that the proposed legislation's re-
quirement that all debtors calculate a prospective ability to pay "would create a hurdle at the front end 
for all, even those who clearly Jack the ability to repay."); Tabb, supra note 23, at 18 ("One glaring flaw 
is that all individual debtors would be required to file a means test calculation with their schedules, even 
though studies estimate that less than a quarter of those debtors actually would be subjected to means 
testing."). 
355. See Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 653, 678 (1999). 
356. See id. (finding that forty-three percent of debtors report income that is not within ten percent of 
expenses). Of course, this may merely mean that debtors have inflated their expenses or that they are 
likely to land in financial distress again. 
357. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 
FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 444 (2002) ("To summarize, all cases would cost more to process, for 
debtors and their attorneys and the system, even when debtors are below median income. Debtors, who 
are often disorganized, would have to get tax returns on file with the court to avoid dismissal."). 
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sumer and insisting that the creditors pay for any discovery. Even if this 
were feasible, however, it would not really solve the fundamental problem 
because in a competitive market the consumer would pay in advance for this 
investigation in the form of higher interest rates. For many consumers it is 
just not appropriate to conduct any investigation into their financial affairs; 
it is better to "means-test" these consumers through punishment. The impo-
sition of a filing fee and certain procedural requirements may serve a useful 
purpose in keeping these consumers out of bankruptcy and in our system of 
non-bankruptcy debt relief. 
Some believe that the very purpose of the additional paperwork pro-
posed by the pending legislation is simply to make bankruptcy more expen-
sive so that fewer low-income consumers can file for bankruptcy?58 If true, 
this is clearly not a sound justification for the reforms. Even if one decides 
that these consumers should be priced out of bankruptcy, one should not do 
so by imposing additional paperwork requirements. The increased paper-
work will raise the cost of filing not because it represents a windfall for 
bankruptcy attorneys but because it will take them longer to complete their 
job. In short, if this paperwork is not necessary, then the time it takes to 
complete the work is wasted and the additional cost of hiring an attorney 
serves solely as a pecuniary penalty that benefits no one. Not only do pecu-
niary penalties fail to distinguish those consumers who can pay their debts 
from those who cannot, but such a pecuniary penalty is also a highly ineffi-
cient means of forcing lower-income consumers to choose other forms of 
debt relief. One could just as easily price these consumers out of the bank-
ruptcy system by raising the filing fee (thus benefiting the courts) or impos-
ing some minimal repayment requirement (thus benefiting the creditors). 
The claim that non-bankruptcy law can perhaps provide debt relief at a 
lower administrative cost than bankruptcy law runs counter to the earlier 
claim that it is more expensive for the consumer to litigate his ability to pay 
with each creditor individually than to settle this question once in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Yet non-bankruptcy law need not use the same method 
to evaluate the consumer's ability to pay. In the extreme, society could 
structure non-bankruptcy law so that the parties would not seek a judicial 
inquiry into the consumer's ability to pay unless such inquiry is likely to be 
cost effective. 
Society may be able to structure non-bankruptcy debt relief laws so that 
higher-income debtors seek relief in bankruptcy while lower-income debt-
ors do not. Assume, for example, that society exempts a significant amount 
of income from garnishment and that creditors have a good estimate of the 
358. See, e.g., Eric A Posner, Commenring on Means Tesring Consumer Bankruprcy by Jean 
Braucher, 7 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 457, 461 (2002) ("Another problem with limiting discharge is 
that for lower income individuals the amounts at stake are too small to be worth the cost of monitoring 
the Chapter 13 plan. This, I take it, is the reason for limiting the 'abuse' test to higher income debtors, 
and using paperwork and other costly requirements in order to deter lower income debtors [from fil. 
ing]."). 
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consumer's financial resources at the time of borrowing. Creditors are likely 
to pursue consumers who once had significant income or assets, and a court 
may have to address the financial status of these consumers if they fail to 
repay. If, however, the consumer lacked significant non-exempt income or 
assets at the time of borrowing, many creditors may simply decide that since 
chances are slim that the debtor's circumstances have improved, it is not 
cost effective to pursue them in court after default. If true, the correct com-
parison is not the cost of one bankruptcy proceeding against the cost of mul-
tiple non-bankruptcy proceedings, but is instead the cost of one bankruptcy 
proceeding against no proceeding at all. 
The parallel nature of debt relief presents both an opportunity and a 
question for proponents of more significant means-testing. It presents an 
opportunity because the existence of non-bankruptcy debt relief allows for 
greater flexibility in the design of the bankruptcy system. Society need not 
design a bankruptcy system to accommodate all consumers if it is willing to 
use non-bankruptcy laws to provide effective debt relief to those left out of 
the bankruptcy system. Yet this argument also presents a challenge because 
a primary argument in favor of means-testing is that it is designed to target 
the wealthy deadbeat rather than to make it more costly for the needy con-
sumer to file. 359 This argument would be more convincing if the proponents 
of means-testing also endorsed changes to non-bankruptcy law designed to 
accommodate those consumers who will no longer have sufficient access to 
bankruptcy relief. 
Of course, one could argue that non-bankruptcy debt relief laws are cur-
rently adequate for the task. One could debate whether non-bankruptcy ex-
emptions of assets and income are sufficiently generous, whether collec-
tions practices are sufficiently regulated, and whether society needs to re-
form its statutes of limitations. Unfortunately, however, this debate would 
be informed by remarkably little empirical evidence. While a cadre of re-
searchers continues to publish useful information on the workings of our 
bankruptcy courts,360 no one has taken a similar look at the non-bankruptcy 
collections process since David Caplovitz's study, thirty years ago.361 While 
still useful, Professor Caplovitz's study predates many of the most impor-
tant federal and state consumer protection laws and thus is unlikely to give 
an accurate representation of modern practice. Given that most consumer 
loans that are not repaid are not discharged in bankruptcy,362 this lack of 
information on non-bankruptcy collections is troubling. 
359. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19, at181-82. 
360. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27. 
361. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 137. 
362. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the number of consumer bankruptcy filings continues to rise, one 
must not lose sight of the fact that bankruptcy is but one part of a larger 
system of debt relief. This Article argues that society could strengthen non-
bankruptcy laws to provide debt relief roughly equivalent to the relief cur-
rently provided in bankruptcy.363 Moreover, if bankruptcy offers procedural 
advantages over non-bankruptcy law, society could adopt a bankruptcy sys-
tem that achieves these advantages while still offering consumers the same 
relief that they would enjoy under non-bankruptcy law.364 Instead of doing 
so, however, society generally offers defaulting consumers some relief from 
their debts under non-bankruptcy law and greater relief if they file for bank-
ruptcy. 
Because bankruptcy is but a single part of a larger system of debt relief, 
the existing normative theories of consumer bankruptcy are incomplete. 
These theories may explain why society would offer debt relief, but not why 
this debt relief must be offered in a system that we call bankruptcy. Thus, 
the questions that have long dominated the corporate bankruptcy scholar-
ship must be answered in the consumer context as well. What role does 
bankruptcy play in a larger system of debtor-creditor law? Why do the sub-
stantive rights of the participants in the bankruptcy process differ from their 
rights under non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor law? The standard explanations 
found in the corporate bankruptcy literature focus on bankruptcy's ability to 
employ a superior means of distributing the debtor's scarce assets among 
creditors. These theories have little relevance for a consumer bankruptcy 
system in which distributions to general creditors are practically non-
existent. 365 
This Article argues that society may rationally offer consumers more 
generous relief in bankruptcy if bankruptcy serves to verify the consumers' 
insolvency and thus their need for debt relief. Thus, the debate over con-
sumer bankruptcy reform should focus not on whether bankruptcy should 
involve means-testing, but rather on the form that the means-testing should 
take. Creditors, or the courts, can investigate a consumer's ability to repay 
her debts as they come due, but American bankruptcy law has largely 
shunned such investigations for most of its history. Rather, American bank-
ruptcy law has largely employed forms of punishment to verify a con-
sumer's inability to repay. 
In deciding the method by which bankruptcy should means-test con-
sumers, one must remain cognizant of the fact that many of these techniques 
can be employed by non-bankruptcy law as well. Non-bankruptcy debtor-
creditor law may serve as a useful complement to bankruptcy by offering a 
parallel system of debt relief that mitigates some of the inevitable gaps in 
363. See supra Part II. 
364. See supra Part II. C. 
365. See supra notes 9- !0 and accompanying text. 
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the Bankruptcy Code. To the extent that bankruptcy forces the consumer to 
wait some period of time before receiving a subsequent discharge, non-
bankruptcy law may help the consumer withstand further misfortune. To the 
extent that bankruptcy conducts an investigation into the consumer's ability 
to repay and thus becomes more expensive, non-bankruptcy law may pro-
vide relief to those who can no longer afford bankruptcy. 
If non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor law is to continue to serve these roles, 
it may need to be reformed along with any reform of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Yet it is difficult to analyze the changes necessary to non-bankruptcy 
debtor-creditor law because this system has largely escaped empirical 
analysis for over thirty years. If we are to effectively evaluate the roles that 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor law are to play in a larger 
system of debt relief, this omission must be rectified. 

